

Paper Summary

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1 Guidelines

General instructions. In Section 2, you find a list of 14 papers, as many as the students enrolled in the class. Each student should pick a paper and write a summary of it (details below). Different papers must be assigned to different students (i.e. two or more students cannot write a report on the same paper). I strongly suggest writing a summary of papers 5 and 6 in a group of two students and a summary of papers 7-9 in a group of three students; these papers are related and this is the best way to benefit from their reading.

How to write the summary. Think of writing a textbook treatment of the paper (or, for that matter, a section of our class' lecture notes). The summary should communicate clearly and concisely the main message of the paper. This requires presenting the model, the main result(s), and a (sketch of the) proof of the main result(s). Sometimes (but not always), an effective way of doing this is working with a toy version of the model that still captures the main insight. Finding the best way to do this exercise is up to you and part of the learning process. Obviously, "copying and pasting" the paper is not a good strategy. As long as you try hard, you won't be penalized if you do not perfectly succeed.

Deadline for the summary. April 12, 2020 (via email).

2 Papers

1. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms." *The American Economic Review*.

Topic: Repeated games with perfect monitoring; Collusion over the business cycle.

2. Bernheim and Whinston (1990), "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior." *The RAND Journal of Economics*.

Topic: Repeated games with perfect monitoring; Collusion.

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3. Abreu (1986), “Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames.” *Journal of Economic Theory*.
Topic: Repeated games with perfect monitoring; Collusion; Application of simple strategies.
4. Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), “Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships.” *Econometrica*.
Topic: Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring; Changing the information structure with the time period.
5. Green and Porter (1984), “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information.” *Econometrica*.
Topic: Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring; Collusion; Equilibrium price war.
6. Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), “Optimal Cartel Equilibrium with Imperfect Monitoring.” *Journal of Economic Theory*.
Topic: Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring; Collusion; Optimal collusive two-state equilibrium in models à la Green and Porter (1984).
7. Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004), “Collusion and Price Rigidity.” *The Review of Economic Studies*.
Topic: Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring; Collusion.
8. Athey and Bagwell (2001), “Optimal Collusion with Private Information.” *The RAND Journal of Economics*.
Topic: Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring; Collusion.
9. Athey and Bagwell (2008), “Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks.” *Econometrica*.
Topic:
10. Levin (2003), “Relational Incentive Contracts.” *The American Economic Review*.
Topic: Repeated games with imperfect public monitoring; relational contracts.
11. Tadelis (1999), “What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradable Asset.” *The American Economic Review*.
Topic: Reputations; Markets for reputations.
12. Abreu and Gul (2000), “Bargaining and Reputation.” *Econometrica*.
Topic: Reputations; Reputational bargaining.

13. Mailath and Samuelson (2001), “Who Wants a Good Reputation?” *The Review of Economic Studies*.

Topic: Reputations; Markov perfect equilibrium; Building reputations through costly investments.

14. Morris (2001), “Political Correctness” *Journal of Political Economy*.

Topic: Reputations; Reputations of expert advisors.