Collective Search in Networks[*]

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Abstract

I study social learning in networks with information acquisition and choice. Rational agents act in sequence, observe the choices of their connections, and acquire information via sequential search. I characterize equilibria of the model by linking agents' search policies to the probability that they select the best action. If search costs are small enough, an improvement principle holds. This allows me to show that asymptotic learning obtains in sufficiently connected networks in which information paths are identifiable. If search costs are bounded away from zero, even a weaker notion of long-run learning fails, except in special networks. When each agent observes a random number of immediate predecessors, the rate of convergence, the probability of wrong herds, and long-run efficiency properties are the same as in the complete network. Network transparency has short-run implications for welfare and efficiency and the density of indirect connections affects convergence rates.

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1 Introduction

When characterizing conditions under which societies correctly aggregate dispersed information or herd on suboptimal behavior, it is standard to assume that agents are endowed with

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exogenous information. Yet, in most circumstances of interest, information is endogenous—agents choosing *how much and what* information to acquire at a *cost*. If agents can choose how much to learn at a cost, do they have the incentive to collect information? On the one hand, it is tempting to free-ride on the information from others' experiences, so that social learning encourages the exploitation of others' wisdom, increasing the chances of wrong herds. On the other hand, the possibility of wrong herds fosters independent exploration, reducing the odds of suboptimal behavior. How do others' experiences and the structure of social ties affect this trade-off and the diffusion of new knowledge? If agents can choose what to learn about, how do others' experiences and the structure of social ties affect agents' information choice? Should agents inquire into the more popular actions, the more recent actions, or neither should guide their information acquisition and choice problems? When do societies settle on the best course of action or, in contrast, suboptimal behavior persists?

I develop a model of social learning in networks with information acquisition and choice to answer these questions. Countably many rational agents act in sequence. Each chooses between two actions. The quality of actions are i.i.d. draws about which agents are initially uninformed. Agents wish to select the action with the highest quality. Each agent observes a subset of earlier agents, the agent's neighborhood. Neighborhoods are drawn from a joint distribution, the *network topology*. The framework allows for arbitrary correlation among neighborhoods. After observing his neighbors' actions, but before selecting his own, an agent engages in *costly sequential search*. Searching perfectly reveals the quality of the sampled action, but comes at a cost (i.i.d. across agents). After sampling an action, the agent decides whether to sample the second action or not. Finally, the agent selects an action from those he has sampled. Individual neighborhoods and sampling decisions remain unobserved.

This is a dynamic game of incomplete information. The network topology shapes agents' ability to learn from others' actions (social information); the *search technology* shapes agents' ability to acquire private information. Social and private information interact: others' actions inform what agents choose to learn about and how much information they acquire. I characterize conditions on network topologies and search technologies for positive long-run learning outcomes to obtain or fail and uncover which learning principles are (not) at play in such setting. Moreover, I provide insights on how social information affect agents' acquisition and choice of private information and characterize how the speed and efficiency of social learning depend on the network topology.

I consider two learning metrics. The first is *asymptotic learning*, which occurs if the probability that agents take the best action converges to one as the size of the society grows large. If search costs are *not* bounded away from zero, asymptotic learning obtains in networks where arbitrarily long information paths occur almost surely and are identifiable. Roughly, asymptotic learning obtains if free experimentation is possible, the network is sufficiently connected, and individual neighborhood realizations do not lead agents astray about the broader network realization.

To identify sufficient conditions for asymptotic learning, I develop an *improvement*

principle (hereafter, IP). The IP captures the idea that improvements upon imitation are sufficient to select the best action in the long run. It is based on the following heuristic. Upon observing his neighbors, each agent chooses one of them to rely on and determines his optimal search policy regardless of what others have done. Consider an agent, say n, and his chosen neighbor, say b. Unless b samples the best action with probability one at the first search, b's expected additional gain from the second search is positive. Thus, if search costs are not bounded away from zero, b samples both actions with positive probability and then takes the best one. Since n finds it optimal to sample first the action taken by b, there is a strict improvement in the probability of sampling the best action at the first search that agent n has over his chosen neighbor. If information paths are identifiable, agents pick the correct neighbor to rely on; if, moreover, information paths are long enough, improvements last until agents select the best action at the first search. Thus, asymptotic learning obtains.

For search costs that are bounded away from zero, I introduce a new metric of social learning, *maximal learning.* Maximal learning occurs if, in the long run, agents take the best action with the same probability as an "expert"—a single agent with the lowest possible search cost type and no social information. If search costs are not bounded away from zero, maximal and asymptotic learning coincide. Otherwise, maximal learning is (weakly) weaker than asymptotic learning and represents the best outcome a society can aim for when arbitrarily low cost draws cannot happen.

Maximal learning obtains if late-moving agents observe *only* the choices of an infinite but proportionally vanishing set of isolated agents (i.e. agents with no neighbors). Since the choices of isolated agents are independent of each other, the share of earlier choices is sufficient for late-moving agents to sample at the first search the action an expert would take. Depending on the primitives of the model, maximal and asymptotic learning may coincide even if arbitrarily low cost draws cannot happen. Thus, search cost that are not bounded away from zero are not always necessary for asymptotic learning. The positive finding, however, is restricted to such exceptional networks. In fact, maximal learning fails in most common deterministic and stochastic networks.

Positive results are fragile with respect to perturbations of the search cost distribution for two reasons. First, when search costs are bounded away from zero, improvements upon imitation are precluded to late moving agents; thus, societies that rely on the IP perform worse than an expert. Second, the model's information structure leaves *large-sample arguments* with little room to operate, as no social belief forming a martingale plays a role in the equilibrium characterization. This prevents societies from learning by aggregating the information that large samples of agents' choices contain.

The learning model I study is non-standard for two reasons. First, agents maximize the value of their search program, rather than the probability of picking the action with the highest quality, which is what matters for the long-run outcome. With sequential search, the two problems are not equivalent. Second, standard large-sample and martingale convergence arguments have no bite in my setup. Nevertheless, I am able to connect

agents' optimization to the probability that they select the best action. This link makes the analysis of long-run outcomes possible. In particular, I connect an agent's optimal sampling sequence and timing to stop the search process to the probability that some of the agents he is directly or indirectly linked to (the agent's personal subnetwork) has sampled both actions. Since sampling both actions allows agents to assess their relative quality, the latter probability is a lower bound for the agent's probability of selecting the best action.

The equilibrium characterization sheds light on how social information affects an agent's sampling sequence and the timing to stop the search process. Different network structures make different actions prominent and result in different sampling sequences. In some cases, such as in the complete network, under uniform random sampling of at most two agents from the past, or in networks where agents observe the choices of possibly correlated random numbers of immediate predecessors (hereafter, OIP networks), agents find it optimal to sample first the action taken by their most recent neighbor.[1] In contrast, agents who observe only isolated agents find it optimal to sample first the more popular action in their neighborhood. In more general networks, however, no informational monotonicity property links an agent's sampling sequence to the actions of his most recent neighbors or to the share of actions he observes. In such cases, neither the most recent nor the most popular actions determine an agent's information choice problem.

For fixed quality of the first action sampled, the expected additional gain from the second search—and so the incentive to explore—is larger for isolated agents than for agents who can exploit the information revealed by their neighbors' choices. For isolated agents, moreover, the expected additional gain from the second search is decreasing in the quality of the first action sampled. In contrast, such gain need not be monotone in the quality of the first action sampled for an agent, say n, with nonempty neighborhood. This is so because the gain depends on the probability that some of the agents in n's personal subnetwork has sampled both actions. This probability need not be monotone in the quality of the first action sampled by n. On the one hand, a high-quality action suggests that some agent in the personal subnetwork has sampled both actions, discarding the one with low quality to adopt the superior one. On the other hand, precisely this effect implies that the incentives to acquire information about the second action (exploit social information) decrease (increase) with the quality of the first action sampled. This is the central trade-off in the setting I study. Depending on the primitives of the model, either force may prevail.

The analysis also provides insights on the speed and efficiency of social learning as a function of the network structure. First, the speed of learning and long-run welfare and efficiency (i.e. when future payoffs are discounted with factor $\delta \to 1$) are the same irrespective of whether each agent observes all prior choices, only the previous choice, or the choices of random numbers of immediate predecessors. That is, in OIP networks these equilibrium outcomes are independent of network transparency, the density of connections,

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[1]To fix ideas, let $1 \leq \ell_n < n$; agents $n - \ell_n, \ldots, n - 1$ are the ℓ_n immediate predecessors of agent n. The complete network is the OIP network where each agent n observes his $n - 1$ immediate predecessors.

and their correlation pattern. The result is striking, but the intuition behind is clear. In OIP networks, each agent's personal subnetwork consists of all his predecessors. Since an agent's search policy depends on the probability that some of the agents in his personal subnetwork has sampled both actions, the probability that the agent selects the best action must be the same across all OIP networks, including the complete network.

Second, I compare equilibrium welfare in OIP networks to a setting where all actions are taken by a single decision maker who internalizes future gains of today's search and needs to sample each of the two actions only once along the same information path. Equilibrium welfare converges to welfare in the single decision maker's solution as $\delta \to 1$ if and only if search costs are not bounded away from zero (i.e. asymptotic learning occurs). If search costs are bounded away from zero or $\delta < 1$, however, welfare losses remain significant.

Third, reducing network transparency leads to inefficient duplication of costly search: agents who do not observe all prior choices fail to recognize actions that are revealed to be inferior by some of their predecessors' choices, thus engaging in overeager search. I compare equilibrium welfare in the complete network (the most efficient OIP network) with that in the network where agents only observe their immediate predecessor (the least efficient OIP network). The welfare difference remains sizable for any $\delta < 1$. Simple policy interventions, such as informing agents about the shares of prior choices, restore in all OIP networks the same welfare as that in the complete network.

Finally, the density of indirect connections affects convergence rates. In particular, convergence to the best action is faster than polynomial in OIP networks, but only faster than logarithmic under uniform random sampling of one agent from the past. Intuitively, learning is slower under uniform random sampling because in such networks the cardinality of agents' personal subnetworks grows at a slower rate than in OIP networks, and so does the probability that one agent in the personal subnetworks samples both actions.

Discussion. The paper contributes to both the economic theory of social learning and its applications to the economics of social media and Internet search. The theoretical contribution is to study costly information acquisition and choice in a model of rational learning over general networks. By and large, the literature on social learning in networks neglects the complexity introduced by costly acquisition of private information. Prior work either focuses on particular network structures, or posits simple individual decision rules. Yet, it acknowledges the importance of a general analysis within the Bayesian benchmark (see, e.g., Sadler (2014) and Golub and Sadler (2016)).

The model is motivated by the large evidence that individuals increasingly use search engines to look for information. Google alone receives several billion search queries per day. In online environments, search is never conducted in isolation; rather, others' experiences are readily available via online social networks and popularity rankings. Thus, what individuals search, the order in which they do so, and their resulting purchase, adoption, or sharing decisions are typically informed by their connections' choices. For instance, suppose we need to decide which of two recently released comedies to watch. The two

movies have a cast and a direction of comparable reputation so that it is ex-ante unclear which one is better. However, we observe on Facebook the movie our friends watched through their check-ins or the Facebook pages they liked. Our friends' decisions give us a first impression of what film is likely to be the best one (for evidence that users learn from their contacts' check-ins, see, e.g., Qiu, Shi and Whinston (2018)). We then search on Google for this movie to learn where and when it is played and to read experts' reviews. Looking for movie times and reading reviews takes time and effort, and this idiosyncratic cost depends on factors that are our private information (whether we are in a rush, how much time we can divert from other activities, etc.). Depending on movie times, reviews, and our opportunity cost, we either watch the movie we first learned about, or invest more time searching for information about the other option. Similarly, people observe on Spotify what songs their connections listen to, and on Flickr the cameras that have been used to take the pictures that other users share. In such cases, the order in which individuals search for a new song or camera is not random, but informed by the choices of their connections, and so is their resulting purchase decision. This paper sheds light on the implications of such behavior for social learning and diffusion. In particular, it identifies the interplay between social information and individual incentives to acquire and choose private information as a central mechanism for emulation and social influence.

More generally, many real-world information acquisition and choice problems are well-modeled by sequential search. The model captures a variety of applications where taking an action requires learning about its quality, functioning, or availability. Examples are widespread: firms need to assess the merits of a new technology before adoption; consumers gather information before purchasing an expensive durable good; investors try to understand different financial instruments before investing; patients inquire into alternative treatments before undergoing a surgery. Social learning and the structure of social ties play a central role in all these phenomena, as documented by a rich empirical literature (see, e.g., Bandiera and Rasul (2006) and Conley and Udry (2010) for technology adoption, Trusov, Bucklin and Pauwels (2009) and Moretti (2011) for product choice and diffusion; Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo and Jackson (2013) and Duflo and Saez (2002, 2003) for the diffusion of financial innovations, investment decisions, and financial planning; Hong, Kubok and Stein (2004) for stock-market participation; Sorensen (2006) for the choice of health plans; Dupas (2014) and Zhang (2010) for the adoption of health products and the decision to undergo a surgery). Existing empirical work does not typically distinguish among different possible mechanisms explaining social influence. This paper identifies information acquisition and choice patterns as an important such mechanism. Thus, studying the interplay between social information, the structure of social ties, and information acquisition seems central to understand social learning phenomena beyond their statistical properties and may pave the way to future empirical work.

Related Literature. The sequential social learning model (hereafter, SSLM) originates with the seminal papers of Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992),

and Smith and Sørensen (2000). In the SSLM, agents wish to match their action with an unknown state of nature and observe both a free private signal and the actions of all prior agents before making their choice. The private signal is informative about the relative quality of all alternatives. Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel and Ozdaglar (2011) and Lobel and Sadler (2015) generalize the SSLM by allowing for partial observability of prior actions according to a stochastic network topology.[2] They develop an IP for the SSLM and identify connectedness and identifiability of information paths as key network properties for improvements upon imitation to lead to positive learning outcomes. I model the observation structure following Acemoglu et al. (2011) and Lobel and Sadler (2015). I find that improvements upon imitation are a key learning principle also in my setting, thus extending the scope of the IP to an informational environment which significantly departs from that of the SSLM.[3] The information structure of my model, however, precludes large-sample and martingale convergence arguments which, in contrast, play a central role in the SSLM.

My paper joins a recent literature on costly information acquisition in social learning settings, including Burguet and Vives (2000), Chamley (2004), Hendricks, Sorensen and Wiseman (2012), Mueller-Frank and Pai (2016) (hereafter, MFP), and Ali (2018). None of these papers focuses on the role of the network structure. When each agent observes all prior actions, my model reduces to that of MFP. MFP study asymptotic learning but not maximal learning, which is new to my paper. They find that asymptotic learning occurs in the complete network if and only if search costs are not bounded away from zero. This equivalence no longer holds in general networks. My analysis identifies network properties under which search costs that are not bounded away from zero are (i) sufficient, (ii) necessary and sufficient, (iii) not necessary, and (iv) not sufficient for asymptotic learning. In addition, I characterize how different network structures affect the speed and efficiency of social learning and uncover which learning principles are (not) at play in such setting. Many properties of the complete network, however, extend to all OIP networks.

In Burguet and Vives (2000), Chamley (2004), and Ali (2018), agents choose how informative a signal to acquire at a cost which depends on the chosen informativeness. While I focus on some search cost types obtaining perfect signals in a discrete action space, they study noisy signals with a continuous (or general, in Ali (2018)) action space. In Hendricks et al. (2012) agents sequentially decide whether to purchase a product or not. Agents have heterogeneous preferences, but identical search cost, at which they can acquire a perfect signal about their value for the product. Agents only observe the aggregate purchase history. In these papers, agents can choose how much to learn, but not what to learn about. Substantial differences among informational environments prevent a direct comparison of our results and require different tools to analyze the learning process.

Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2018) study innovation adoption in networks. Agents

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[2] Smith and Sørensen (2014) introduce neighbor sampling in the SSLM but, differently than in my model, they assume that individuals ignore the identity of the agents they observe.

[3] The IP relates to the welfare improvement principle in Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) and Smith and Sørensen (2014), and to the imitation principle in Bala and Goyal (1998) and Gale and Kariv (2003).

observe whether their neighbors have adopted the innovation and decide whether to gather information about its quality via costly inspection. Whereas I mostly focus on long-run outcomes, they focus on the impact of network structure on learning dynamics and diffusion at each point in time.

My model relates to those of sequential information acquisition of Wald (1947), Weitzman (1979), and Moscarini and Smith (2001), in which a single decision maker dynamically chooses how much information to acquire before taking an action. Weitzman (1979) considers a sequential search environment where an agent faces a bandit problem, each arm representing a distinct alternative with a random prize, and characterizes the optimal sampling sequence and timing to stop the search process. Each agent in my model faces the same problem and trade-off between exploration (sampling the second action) and exploitation (taking the action believed to be the best according to his social information).[4] More broadly, my work connects to the recent literature on the dynamics of information choice in learning environments: Sethi and Yildiz (2016, 2018), Che and Mierendorff (2018), Mayskaya (2019), Fudenberg, Strack and Strzalecki (2018), Liang, Mu and Syrgkanis (2018), Liang and Mu (2019), and Zhong (2019). Studying how social information and the network structure affect information acquisition and choice is new to my paper.

Salish (2017) and Sadler (2017) study learning in networks in which finitely many agents acquire private information by experimenting with a two-armed bandit and observe their neighbors' experimentation. Agents interact repeatedly, and so the strategic component of their interaction is more involved than in my setting. However, this comes at a cost. Sadler (2017) allows for complex networks, but agents follow a boundedly rational decision rule. In Salish (2017) agents are rational, but a sharp characterization only obtains for particular network structures. In contrast, I accommodate both for rational behavior and general network topologies. Perego and Yuksel (2016) study a model of learning in which a continuum of Bayesian agents repeatedly choose between learning from one's own experimentation or learning from others' experiences. Connections are heterogeneous across agents and peer-to-peer exchange of information is subject to frictions. The authors characterize how frictions and heterogeneity in connections affect the creation and diffusion of knowledge in equilibrium, but do not focus on network properties other than connectivity.

Kultti and Miettinen (2006, 2007), Celen and Hyndman (2012), Song (2016), and Nei (2016) consider costly observability of past histories in the SSLM. In these papers private information is free, while which agents' actions to observe is endogenously determined. In contrast, I study costly acquisition of private information in exogenous network structures.

The literature on learning in networks is larger than the work surveyed here. I refer to Goyal (2007, 2011), Jackson (2008), Vives (2010), Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011), Mobius and Rosenblat (2014), and Golub and Sadler (2016) for excellent accounts of the field.

Road Map. In Section 2, I describe the model. In Section 3, I characterize equilibrium

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[4]The trade-off between exploration and exploitation is the distinctive feature of bandit problems. I refer to Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) for a survey of bandit problems in economics.

strategies, and discuss how social information affects the acquisition and the choice of private information. In Section 4, I establish the improvement principle and provide sufficient and necessary conditions for asymptotic learning. In Section 5, I present the main results with respect to maximal learning, and discuss the limitations of the improvement principle and of large-sample arguments. In Section 6, I present the main results on the rate of convergence, welfare, and efficiency. In Section 7, I conclude. Supporting examples are in Appendix A and formal proofs are in Appendix B.

2   Model

2.1   Collective Search Environment

Agents and Actions. A countably infinite set of agents, indexed by $n \in \mathbb{N} := \{1, 2, \dots\}$, sequentially select a single action each. Agent n acts at time n. Each agent has to choose one of two possible alternatives in the set of available actions $X := \{0, 1\}$, which is identical across agents. Restricting attention to two actions simplifies the exposition, but does not affect the results. Let x denote a typical element of X and a_n the action agent n selects. Calendar time is common knowledge and the order of moves exogenous.

State Process. Actions differ in their qualities, but are ex-ante homogeneous. Let q_x denote the quality of action x. Qualities q_0 and q_1 are i.i.d. draws from a probability measure $\mathbb{P}_Q$ over $Q \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+ := \{s \in \mathbb{R} : s \geq 0\}$. The state of the world $\omega := (q_0, q_1)$ consists of the realized quality of the two actions and is drawn once and for all at time zero. The state space is $\Omega := Q \times Q$, with product measure $\mathbb{P}_\Omega := \mathbb{P}_Q \times \mathbb{P}_Q$. This formulation captures finite, and countably and uncountably infinite state spaces. The resulting probability space, $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_\Omega, \mathbb{P}_\Omega)$, is the *state process* of the model and is common knowledge. Whenever convenient, I denote the state process with $(Q, \mathcal{F}_Q, \mathbb{P}_Q)$.

Agents wish to select the action with the highest quality. To do so, they have access to two sources of information: *social information*, which is derived from observing a subset of past agents' actions, and *private information*, which is endogenously acquired by costly sequential search. The next two paragraphs describe the two processes in detail.

Network Topology. Agents observe the actions of a subset of past agents, as defined by the structure of the social network, as first modeled in Acemoglu et al. (2011) and Lobel and Sadler (2015). The set of agents whose actions agent n observes, denoted by $B(n)$, is called n's neighborhood. Since agents only observes actions taken previously, $B(n) \in 2^{\mathbb{N}_n}$, where $2^{\mathbb{N}_n}$ denotes the power set of $\mathbb{N}_n := \{m \in \mathbb{N} : m < n\}$. Neighborhoods $B(n)$ are random variables generated via a probability measure $\mathbb{Q}$ on the product space $\mathbb{B} := \prod_{n \in \mathbb{N}} 2^{\mathbb{N}_n}$. Given a measure $\mathbb{Q}$ on $\mathbb{B}$, I refer to the resulting probability space $(\mathbb{B}, \mathcal{F}_\mathbb{B}, \mathbb{Q})$ as the *network topology*. Particular realizations of the random variables $B(n)$ are denoted by B_n.

The formulation allows for arbitrary correlations between agents' neighborhoods,

as well as for independent neighborhoods (when $B(n)$'s are generated by probability measures $\mathbb{Q}_n$'s on $2^{\mathbb{N}_n}$ and the draws from each $\mathbb{Q}_n$ are independent from each other) and deterministic network topologies (when $\mathbb{Q}$ is a Dirac distribution on a single element of $\mathbb{B}$).

The sequence of neighborhood realizations describes a network of connections between the agents. The network topology is common knowledge, whereas the realized neighborhood B_n is agent n's private information. If $n' \in B_n$, then n not only observes $a_{n'}$, but also knows the identity of this agent (equivalently, the time at which this agent has acted). Crucially, however, n does not necessarily observe $B_{n'}$ or the actions of the agents in $B_{n'}$. Neighborhood realizations are independent of the actions' qualities and the realizations of private search costs (to be introduced momentarily).

This framework nests most of the network topologies commonly observed in the data and studied in the literature. Among many others, it accommodates for observation of all previous agents (complete network), random sampling from the past, observation of the most recent $M \geq 1$ individuals, networks with influential groups of agents, and the popular preferential attachment and small-world networks (see Acemoglu et al. (2011) and Lobel and Sadler (2015)).

Search Technology. Private information about the quality of the two actions is acquired through costly sequential search with recall. After observing his neighborhood $B(n)$ and the actions of the agents in $B(n)$, agent n decides which action $s_n^1 \in X$ to sample first.[5] Sampling an action perfectly reveals its quality to the agent. I denote the quality of the first action sampled by agent n as $q_{s_n^1}$. After observing $q_{s_n^1}$, agent n decides whether to sample the remaining action, $s_n^2 = \neg s_n^1$, where $\neg s_n^1$ denotes the action in X not sampled initially, or to discontinue searching, $s_n^2 = ns$. That is, $s_n^2 \in \{\neg s_n^1, ns\}$. Let S_n denote the set of actions agent n samples. After sampling has stopped, the agent chooses an action a_n. Agents can only select an action they sampled, that is $a_n \in S_n$. For a single agent, the search problem is a version of Weitzman (1979). When each agent observes all past actions, my model reduces to that of Mueller-Frank and Pai (2016).

For simplicity, the first action is sampled at no cost, while sampling the second action involves a cost $c_n \in C \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+$.[6] Search costs c_n are i.i.d. across agents, are drawn from a commonly known probability measure $\mathbb{P}_C$ over C, with associated CDF F_C, and are independent of the network topology and the quality of the two actions. I refer to the probability space $(C, \mathcal{F}_C, \mathbb{P}_C)$, together with the sequential search rule, denoted by $\mathcal{R}$, as the *search technology* of the model. An agent's search cost and sampling decisions are his private information. That is, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, agent n's search cost c_n and sampling decisions are not observed by later moving agents.

Payoffs. The *net utility* of agent n is given by the difference between the quality of the

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[5]If neighborhoods are correlated, neighborhood realizations convey information about whom an agent's neighbors are likely to have observed.

[6]It is equivalent if the two searches cost the same amount c_n, but each agent has to take an action, i.e. he cannot abstain, and therefore must conduct at least one search.

action he takes and the search cost he incurs. That is,

$$U_n(S_n, a_n, c_n, \omega) := q_{a_n} - c_n(|S_n| - 1).$$

Collective Search Environment. A *collective search environment*, denoted by $\mathcal{S}$, consists of the set of agents $\mathbb{N}$, a state process $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_\Omega, \mathbb{P}_\Omega)$, a network topology $(\mathbb{B}, \mathcal{F}_\mathbb{B}, \mathbb{Q})$, and a search technology $\{(C, \mathcal{F}_C, \mathbb{P}_C), \mathcal{R}\}$. That is,

$$\mathcal{S} := \{\mathbb{N}, (\Omega, \mathcal{F}_\Omega, \mathbb{P}_\Omega), (\mathbb{B}, \mathcal{F}_\mathbb{B}, \mathbb{Q}), \{(C, \mathcal{F}_C, \mathbb{P}_C), \mathcal{R}\}\}.$$

2.2 Information and Strategies

Each collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$ results in a dynamic game of incomplete information (henceforth, game of social learning). For each agent n, I distinguish three different information sets. The first information set $I^1(n)$ corresponds to n's information prior to sampling any action; it consists of his search cost c_n, his neighborhood $B(n)$, and all actions of agents in $B(n)$:

$$I^1(n) := \{c_n, B(n), a_k \ \forall \, k \in B(n)\}.$$

The set $I^2(n)$ is the information set agent n has after sampling the first action, that is

$$I^2(n) := \left\{c_n, B(n), a_k \ \forall \, k \in B(n), q_{s_n^1}\right\},$$

which also includes the quality of the first action sampled. Finally, $I^a(n)$ corresponds to the information set of agent n once his search ends:

$$I^a(n) := \{c_n, B(n), a_k \ \forall \, k \in B(n), \{q_s : s \in S_n\}\}.$$

$I^1(n), I^2(n)$, and $I^a(n)$ are random variables whose realizations I denote by I_n^1, I_n^2, and I_n^a. I refer to $I^1(n)$ and $I^2(n)$ as agent n's first and second search stage information sets, and to $I^a(n)$ as agent n's choice stage information set. The classes of all possible search stage and choice stage information sets of agent n are denoted by $\mathcal{I}_n^r$, for $r \in \{1, 2\}$, and $\mathcal{I}_n^a$.

A strategy for agent n is an ordered triple of mappings $\sigma_n := (\sigma_n^1, \sigma_n^2, \sigma^a)$, where $\sigma_n^1 \colon \mathcal{I}_n^1 \to \Delta(\{0, 1\})$, $\sigma_n^2 \colon \mathcal{I}_n^2 \to (\{\neg s_n^1, ns\})$, and $\sigma_n^a \colon \mathcal{I}_n^a \to \Delta(S_n)$. Let $\sigma := (\sigma_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ denote a strategy profile and $\sigma_{-n} := (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_{n-1}, \sigma_{n+1}, \dots)$ the strategies of all agents other than n. Given a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$ and a strategy profile σ, the sequence of actions $(a_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a stochastic process with probability measure $\mathbb{P}_\sigma$ generated by the state process, the network topology, the search technology, and the mixed strategy of each agent. Formally, for a fixed σ, the sequence $(a_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is determined by the realization in the probability space[7] $Y := \Omega \times \mathbb{B} \times C^\infty \times D^\infty$. Here, C^∞ is the set of possible realizations

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[7]Formal notation about the event space and probability measure is standard, and thus omitted.

of agents' search costs, $(D, \mathcal{F}_D, \lambda)$ is a probability space determining the possible mixed strategy realizations of a given agent, and Ω and $\mathbb{B}$ have been introduced before.

2.3   Equilibrium Notion

The solution concept is the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game of social learning.

Definition 1. *Fix a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$. A strategy profile $\sigma := (\sigma_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a* perfect Bayesian equilibrium *of the corresponding game of social learning if, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, σ_n is an optimal policy for agent n's sequential search and action choice problems given other agents' strategies σ_{-n}.*

Hereafter, I use the term equilibria to mean perfect Bayesian equilibria. I denote with $\Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ the set of equilibria of the game of social learning corresponding to $\mathcal{S}$.

In any collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$, given a strategy profile for the agents acting prior to n, and a realization of n's information sets $I_n^r \in \mathcal{I}_n^r$ for $r \in \{1, 2\}$ and $I_n^a \in \mathcal{I}_n^a$, agent n' decision problems at the search and choice stages are discrete choice problems. Thus, they have a well-defined solution that only requires randomization in case of indifference at some stage (see Section 3.2.2 for a characterization of individual equilibrium decisions). For given criteria to break ties, an inductive argument shows that $\Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ is nonempty.

Proposition 1. *For any collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$, the set of equilibria $\Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ is nonempty.*

In general, however, the game of social learning admits multiple equilibria since some agents may be indifferent between the available alternatives at the search or choice stage.

Whenever a strategy profile or an equilibrium σ is fixed and no confusion arises, I denote agent n's decisions according to his (equilibrium) strategy $\sigma_n := (\sigma_n^1, \sigma_n^2, \sigma_n^a)$ as

$$s_n^1 := \sigma_n^1, \qquad s_n^2 := \sigma_n^2, \qquad a_n := \sigma_n^a.$$

3   Long-Run Learning and Equilibrium Strategies

In this section, I define asymptotic learning, which is the first long-run learning metric considered in the paper. Then, I characterize equilibrium strategies by relating individual sequential search policies to the probability that agents select the best action. Finally, I discuss how social information affects the acquisition of private information.

3.1   Asymptotic Learning: Definition

The first goal is to characterize conditions under which agents eventually select the action with the highest quality with probability one. This is a natural benchmark for the learning

process—the same limiting outcome would occur if each agent observed the private search decisions of all prior agents and (at least) one of these agents actually sampled both actions.

Definition 2. *Let a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$ and an equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ be given. Asymptotic learning* occurs in equilibrium σ *if*

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left(a_n \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \right) = 1.$$

Studying asymptotic learning requires understanding how the quantity

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma \left(a_n \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \right) \tag{1}$$

evolves over time. At the same time, agents use their information to optimize the value of their own sequential search program $U_n(S_n, a_n, c_n, \omega) := q_{a_n} - c_n(|S_n| - 1)$, a problem which need not be equivalent to maximizing the quantity in (1) or the ex ante expected utility.[8] This discrepancy raises some conceptual challenges one needs to address before establishing the main results. To this purpose, the next subsection characterizes equilibrium search policies by linking the dynamics of agents' optimization to the dynamics of the quantity $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(a_n \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x)$, thus making the analysis of long-run outcomes possible.

3.2 Equilibrium Strategies

Before characterizing equilibrium strategies, I recall the notion of personal subnetwork from Lobel and Sadler (2015) and introduce the concept of personal subnetwork relative to action $x \in X$.

3.2.1 Preliminaries

Definition 3. *Fix a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$, a strategy profile σ, and an agent $n \in \mathbb{N}$:*

(a) *Agent $m < n$ belongs to* agent n's personal subnetwork *if there exists a sequence of agents, starting with m and terminating with n, such that each member of the sequence is contained in the neighborhood of the next. Agent n's personal subnetwork is denoted by $\hat{B}(n)$.*

(b) *Agent $m < n$ belongs to* agent n's personal subnetwork relative to action $x \in X$ *if $m \in \hat{B}(n)$ and $a_m = x$. Agent n's personal subnetwork relative to action x is denoted by $\hat{B}(n, x)$.*

Agent n's personal subnetwork is the set of all agents that are connected to n, either directly or indirectly, as of the time n must make a decision. Intuitively, agent

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[8]An analogous remark applies to maximal learning, introduced in Section 5.

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n's personal subnetwork consists of those agents that are, either directly or indirectly (through neighbors, neighbors of neighbors, and so on) observed by agent n. Agent n's personal subnetwork relative to action x consists of those agents that are, either directly or indirectly, observed by agent n to choose action x. Clearly, $\hat{B}(n) = \hat{B}(n,0) \cup \hat{B}(n,1)$. Realizations of the random variables $\hat{B}(n)$ and $\hat{B}(n,x)$ are denoted by $\hat{B}_n$ and $\hat{B}_{n,x}$.

3.2.2 Characterization of Equilibrium Sequential Search Policies

Fix a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$. In the corresponding game of social learning, equilibrium behavior is characterized as follows.

Choice stage. An agent's optimal policy at the choice stage is mechanical: if he only sampled one action, he takes that action; if he sampled both, he takes the action with the highest quality, randomizing according to his mixed strategy if the two actions have the same quality. Therefore, I omit the formal notation.

I characterize equilibrium search policies by first considering the search problem of an agent with no social connections and then that of an agent who observes others' choices.

Search policy for an agent with empty neighborhood. Consider an agent n who does not observe any other agent, that is with $B_n = \emptyset$. This is, for instance, the case of the first agent. Fix a strategy profile σ_{-n} for agents other than n. Since an agent's neighborhood is independent of the qualities of the two actions and the choices of previous agents, in the absence of any additional information the marginal distributions of the qualities of the two actions are identical (and equal to the prior $\mathbb{P}_Q$). According to Weitzman (1979)'s optimal search rule, either action may be sampled first. Therefore, the strategy of such agent n is described by two non-negative functions, $\pi_n^0(\cdot)$ and $\pi_n^1(\cdot)$, such that $\pi_n^0(I_n^1) + \pi_n^1(I_n^1) = 1$ for all $I_n^1 \in \mathcal{I}_n^1$ with $B_n = \emptyset$. Here, $\pi_n^x(I_n^1)$ denotes the probability that agent n with information set I_n^1 samples action x first.

Suppose the action agent n samples first, s_n^1, has quality $q_{s_n^1}$. Agent n will only sample the second action if his search cost c_n is smaller than the expected additional gain of sampling the second action, denoted by $t^\emptyset(q_{s_n^1})$, where $t^\emptyset \colon Q \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is defined pointwise by

$$t^\emptyset\left(q_{s_n^1}\right) := \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\left[\max\left\{q - q_{s_n^1}, 0\right\}\right] = \int_{q \geq q_{s_n^1}} \left(q - q_{s_n^1}\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbb{P}_Q(q). \tag{2}$$

If $c_n = t^\emptyset(q_{s_n^1})$, agent n is indifferent between searching further or not. Again, his strategy is described by two non-negative functions, $\pi_n^{\neg s_n^1}(\cdot)$ and $\pi_n^{ns}(\cdot)$, such that $\pi_n^{\neg s_n^1}(I_n^2) + \pi_n^{ns}(I_n^2) = 1$ for all $I_n^2 \in \mathcal{I}_n^2$ with $B_n = \emptyset$. Here, $\pi_n^{\neg s_n^1}(I_n^2)$ $(\pi_n^{ns}(I_n^2))$ is the probability that agent n with information set I_n^2 samples (does not sample) action $\neg s_n^1 \in X$.[9]

Search policy for an agent with nonempty neighborhood. Consider next an agent n who observes the choices of other agents, that is with $B_n \neq \emptyset$. Fix a strategy profile

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[9]Henceforth, I omit the formal notation to describe agents' mixed strategies.

σ_{-n} for agents other than n. The personal subnetwork of agent n contains conclusive information about the relative quality of the two actions if and only if some agents in the subnetwork have sampled both actions. In particular, consider agent n's conditional belief over the state space Ω given his information set I_n^1. For each action $x \in X$ only two mutually exclusive cases are possible:

1. At least one agent in $\hat{B}(n, x)$ has sampled both actions. If agent n knew this to be the case, his conditional belief on Ω would be $\mathbb{P}_{\Omega | q_x \geq q_{\neg x}}$, where $\neg x$ denotes the action in X other than x. This is so because agents sampling both actions select the alternative with the highest quality at the choice stage.

2. None of the agents in $\hat{B}(n, x)$ has sampled both actions. If agent n knew this to be the case, the posterior belief on action $\neg x$ would be the same as the prior $\mathbb{P}_Q$.

To understand the optimal search policy of agent n, consider the probability space $Y := \Omega \times \mathbb{B} \times C^\infty \times D^\infty$ and the following events in Y:

$$E_n^x := \left\{ y \in Y : s_k^2 = ns \; \forall k \in \hat{B}(n, x) \right\} \qquad \text{for } x = 0, 1. \tag{3}$$

In words, event E_n^x occurs when none of the agents in the personal subnetwork of agent n relative to action x samples both actions. Let $I_n^1 := \{c_n, B_n, a_k \; \forall k \in B_n\}$ be agent n's realized information set prior to sampling any action. Given σ_{-n}, agent n can compute the probabilities

$$P_n(x) := \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}} \left(E_n^x \mid I_n^1 \right) \qquad \text{for } x = 0, 1. \tag{4}$$

These probabilities allow agent n to rank the marginal distributions of the quality of the two actions in terms of first-order stochastic dominance. If $P_n(0) < P_n(1)$, agent n's belief about the quality of action 0 strictly first-order stochastically dominates his belief about the quality of action 1. Therefore, according to Weitzman (1979)'s optimal search rule, agent n samples first action 0: $s_n^1 = 0$. If $P_n(1) < P_n(0)$, by an analogous argument agent n samples first action 1: $s_n^1 = 1$. Finally, if $P_n(0) = P_n(1)$, the marginal distributions of the quality of the two actions are identical in the eyes of agent n, who then selects the action to sample first according to his mixed strategy.

To formalize the argument, pick any $x \in X$ and q with $\min \operatorname{supp}(\mathbb{P}_Q) < q < \max \operatorname{supp}(\mathbb{P}_Q)$, and note:

$$\mathbb{P}_Q(q_x \leq q) = \mathbb{P}_Q(q_{\neg x} \leq q), \tag{5}$$

$$\mathbb{P}_{\Omega | q_{\neg x} \geq q_x}(q_x \leq q) = \mathbb{P}_{\Omega | q_x \geq q_{\neg x}}(q_{\neg x} \leq q), \tag{6}$$

and $\qquad \mathbb{P}_{\Omega | q_{\neg x} \geq q_x}(q_x \leq q) > \mathbb{P}_Q(q_x \leq q). \tag{7}$

Suppose $P_n(x) < P_n(\neg x)$. Conditional on I_n^1, agent n's belief about the quality of action x strictly first-order stochastically dominates his belief about action $\neg x$. In fact,

$$\mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}} \left(q_{\neg x} \leq q \mid I_n^1 \right) = \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}} \left(q_{\neg x} \leq q \mid E_n^x, I_n^1 \right) \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}} \left(E_n^x \mid I_n^1 \right)$$

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$$+ \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}}\left(q_{\neg x} \leq q \mid E_n^{xC}, I_n^1\right) \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}}\left(E_n^{xC} \mid I_n^1\right)$$

$$= \mathbb{P}_Q(q_{\neg x} \leq q) P_n(x) + \mathbb{P}_{\Omega \mid q_x \geq q_{\neg x}}(q_{\neg x} \leq q)(1 - P_n(x))$$

$$= \mathbb{P}_Q(q_x \leq q) P_n(x) + \mathbb{P}_{\Omega \mid q_{\neg x} \geq q_x}(q_x \leq q)(1 - P_n(x))$$

$$> \mathbb{P}_Q(q_x \leq q) P_n(\neg x) + \mathbb{P}_{\Omega \mid q_{\neg x} \geq q_x}(q_x \leq q)(1 - P_n(\neg x))$$

$$= \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}}\left(q_x \leq q \mid E_n^{\neg x}, I_n^1\right) \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}}\left(E_n^{\neg x} \mid I_n^1\right)$$

$$+ \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}}\left(q_x \leq q \mid E_n^{\neg xC}, I_n^1\right) \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}}\left(E_n^{\neg xC} \mid I_n^1\right)$$

$$= \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}}\left(q_x \leq q \mid I_n^1\right).$$

Here, E_n^{xC} ($E_n^{\neg xC}$) is the complement of E_n^x ($E_n^{\neg x}$), the third equality holds by (5) and (6), and the inequality follows from (7) and the assumption $P_n(x) < P_n(\neg x)$.

Now, let $I_n^2 := \{c_n, B_n, a_k \ \forall k \in B_n, q_{s_n^1}\}$ be agent n's realized information set after having sampled a first action of quality $q_{s_n^1}$. Given σ_{-n}, agent n needs to infer the posterior probability that action $\neg s_n^1$ was not sampled by any of the agents in $\hat{B}(n, s_n^1)$, as only in this case he can benefit from the second search. That is, he must compute

$$P_n\left(q_{s_n^1}\right) := \mathbb{P}_{\sigma_{-n}}\left(E_n^{s_n^1} \mid I_n^2\right), \tag{8}$$

where also the information about the quality of the first action sampled is used. With remaining probability, at least one of those agents sampled action $\neg s_n^1$, but nevertheless chose action s_n^1, in which case s_n^1 is (weakly) superior by revealed preferences. Agent n's expected benefit from sampling action $\neg s_n^1$ is therefore $P_n(q_{s_n^1}) t^{\emptyset}(q_{s_n^1})$, where $t^{\emptyset}(\cdot)$ is defined by (2) and describes the gross benefit of the second search (the benefit agent n would have if he did not observe any other agent) when a payoff of $q_{s_n^1}$ has already been secured. It follows that he should only sample further if his search cost c_n is less than $t_n(q_{s_n^1})$, where $t_n \colon Q \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is defined pointwise as

$$t_n\left(q_{s_n^1}\right) := P_n\left(q_{s_n^1}\right) t^{\emptyset}\left(q_{s_n^1}\right). \tag{9}$$

If $c_n = t_n(q_{s_n^1})$, agent n is indifferent between searching further and discontinuing search; consequently, he resolves the uncertainty according to his mixed strategy.

Unless noted otherwise, hereafter I assume that agents sample the second action in case of indifference at the second search stage, and that they break ties uniformly at random whenever indifferent at the first search stage or at the choice stage. The assumption is consistent with the idea that agents do not prefer an action over the other because of its label, and that labels do not convey any information about agents' behavior. Selecting a particular equilibrium simplifies the exposition, but the results do not depend on this tie-breaking criterion.

Remark 1. For all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, agent n's equilibrium sequential search policy is essentially described by the probabilities $P_n(x)$ and $P_n(q_x)$, defined by (4) and (8) for all $x \in X$ and

$q_x \in Q$. This characterization relates the dynamics of agents' optimization to the dynamics of the probability that they select the best action. Roughly, the intuition is the following:[10]

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{P}_\sigma \left(a_n \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \right) &\geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \right) \\
&\geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left(\left\{ y \in Y : \exists\, k \in \hat{B}\left(n, s_n^1\right) \text{ such that } s_k^2 = \neg s_k^1 \right\} \right) \\
&= 1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left(\left\{ y \in Y : s_k^2 = ns \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}\left(n, s_n^1\right) \right\} \right) \\
&= 1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left(E_n^{s_n^1} \right).
\end{aligned}
$$

Here, the first inequality holds as agent n takes the action of better quality among those he has sampled. The second inequality follows because if an agent in $\hat{B}(n, s_n^1)$ samples both actions and takes action s_n^1, then s_n^1 is superior by revealed preferences. In turn, the first equality holds as the two events at issue are one the complement of another, and the second equality holds by definition of $E_n^{s_n^1}$ (see (3)). This link unravels the complications illustrated at the end of Section 3.1 and will prove a central tool to establish long-run learning results in the analysis to come.

Remark 2. In the collective search environments I study, there is no social belief that forms a martingale and, at the same time, is of some use when characterizing equilibrium behavior. Thus, large-sample and martingale convergence arguments, which are standard tools to study aggregation of dispersed information in social learning settings, have no bite in the present setup. As I will formalize in Section 5.5, this feature undermines the possibility to learn via the direct observation of large samples of other agents and the aggregation of the information that their choices convey.

3.3   Social Information and Equilibrium Search

Social and private information interact: others' actions inform what agents choose to learn about and how much information they gather. The equilibrium characterization sheds light on how social information affects an agent's optimal sampling sequence and timing to stop the search process.

Social Information and Information Choice. Different network structures make different actions prominent and result in different optimal sampling sequences. In some networks, agents always find it optimal to sample first the action taken by their most recent neighbor, independently of what action their other neighbors may have taken. This is so, for instance, in the complete network, under uniform random sampling of at most two past agents, and in networks in which agents observe random numbers of immediate predecessors (see Section 6.1). In contrast, agents who observe only agents with no neighbors always find it optimal to sample first the action with the highest relative share in their neighborhood

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[10]I refer to Appendix B for the formal details.

(see Example 3 in Section 5.5). In more general network topologies, however, there is no informational monotonicity property linking an agent's sampling sequence to the actions of his most recent neighbors or to the relative fraction of actions he observes. In such cases, though social information guides an agent's optimal sampling sequence, neither the most recent nor the most popular actions uniquely determine the agent's information choice.

Social Information and Information Acquisition. Myopic agents face a trade-off between *exploration* (sampling the second action) and *exploitation* (using the information revealed by others' choices to save on the cost of the second search). The characterization of the optimal search policies sheds light on how such trade-off is resolved in equilibrium.

First, (2) and (9) imply $t_n(q) \leq t^{\emptyset}(q)$ for all $q \in Q$, as $P_n(q) \in [0, 1]$. That is, given the quality of the first action sampled, the expected additional gain from the second search is smaller for an agent with nonempty neighborhood than for an agent with empty neighborhood. Thus, if an agent with search cost type c and empty neighborhood discontinues search after sampling an action of quality q, so does an agent with the same search cost type and nonempty neighborhood after sampling an action of the same quality. In short, agents with no neighbors have stronger incentives to explore than agents who exploit the information revealed by their neighbors' choices.

Second, for agents with empty neighborhood, the expected additional gain from the second search, and so the incentive to explore, decreases with the quality of the first action sampled: $t^{\emptyset}(q) \leq t^{\emptyset}(q')$ for all $q, q' \in Q$ with $q \geq q'$. Thus, if an agent with search cost type c and empty neighborhood discontinues search after sampling an action of quality q, so does any other agent with the same search cost type after sampling an action of quality $q' \geq q$.

Finally, the quality of the first action sampled has ambiguous effects on the incentives to explore of an agent, say n, with nonempty neighborhood. This is so because n's expected additional gain from the second search, $P_n(q_{s_n^1}) t^{\emptyset}(q_{s_n^1})$, depends on the probability $P_n(q_{s_n^1})$ that none of the agents in his personal subnetwork relative to action s_n^1 has sampled action $\neg s_n^1$ given that the quality of s_n^1 is $q_{s_n^1}$. This probability need not be monotonic in $q_{s_n^1}$ and depends on the network topology, the state process, and the search technology. On the one hand, an action of high quality suggests that some agent has explored both alternatives, discarding the one with low quality to adopt the superior one. On the other hand, precisely this effect, combined with the fact that $t^{\emptyset}(q)$ decreases in q, hints that the incentives to acquire information about the second action (exploit the information revealed by others' choices) decrease (increase) with the quality of the first action sampled. This is the central trade-off in the environment I study. Depending on the primitives of the model, either force may prevail. Thus, the effect of an increase in $q_{s_n^1}$ on $P_n(q_{s_n^1})$ and, ultimately, on $P_n(q_{s_n^1}) t^{\emptyset}(q_{s_n^1})$, is ambiguous. In Appendix A, I construct two examples to show that $P_n(q_{s_n^1}) t^{\emptyset}(q_{s_n^1})$ can either increase or decrease as $q_{s_n^1}$ increases depending on the primitives of the model.

4 Asymptotic Learning

The search technology shapes agents' possibility to acquire private information and the network topology shapes agents' possibility to learn by observing others' behavior. In this section and in Section 5, I provide conditions on these primitives under which (different) positive learning results obtain or fail in the long run.

4.1 Preliminaries

Since the characterization of learning outcomes will hinge on the properties of the search technology, I first present the relevant terminology and assumptions.

Definition 4. *Let* $\{(C, \mathcal{F}_C, \mathbb{P}_C), \mathcal{R}\}$ *be a search technology:*

(a) *The search cost $\underline{c}$ is the* lowest cost in the support of $\mathbb{P}_C$ *if, for all $\varepsilon > 0$, $F_C(\underline{c}+\varepsilon) > 0$ and $F_C(\underline{c} - \varepsilon) = 0$.*

(b) *Search costs are* bounded away from zero *if $\underline{c} > 0$; conversely, search costs are* not bounded away from zero *if $\underline{c} = 0$.*

In words, search costs are not bounded away from zero if there is a positive probability of arbitrarily low search costs.

The next assumption is a joint restriction on the state process and the search technology which is maintained throughout the paper. It rules out uninteresting learning problems.

Assumption 1 (**Non-Trivial Collective Search Environment**)**.** *There exist $\tilde{q}, \tilde{q}'$ in the support of $\mathbb{P}_Q$, possibly with $\tilde{q} = \tilde{q}'$, such that:*

1. (a) $\mathbb{P}_Q(q > \tilde{q}) > 0$;

   (b) $1 - F_C\big(t^{\emptyset}(\tilde{q})\big) > 0$. *That is, the distribution of search costs is such that, with positive probability, an agent with empty neighborhood does not sample another action when the first action sampled has quality $\tilde{q}$ or higher.*

2. (a) $\mathbb{P}_Q(q \leq \tilde{q}') > 0$;

   (b) $F_C\big(t^{\emptyset}(\tilde{q})\big) > 0$. *That is, the distribution of search costs is such that, with positive probability, an agent with empty neighborhood samples another action when the first action sampled has quality $\tilde{q}'$ or lower.*

When *Part 1.* of the assumption fails, in equilibrium, agents with empty neighborhood sample both actions and take the one with the highest quality, whereas agents with nonempty neighborhood just follow the behavior of any of their neighbors. Thus, asymptotic learning trivially obtains. When *Part 2.* fails, instead, agents never search in equilibrium: each agent samples the first action at no cost and takes that action. As a result, there is no prospect for social learning since both actions must be sampled by at least one agent in order to evaluate their relative quality.

4.2 Sufficient Conditions

If search costs are not bounded away from zero, I show that an improvement principle (hereafter, IP) holds. The IP allows me to show that asymptotic learning obtains if, in the network topology, arbitrarily long information paths occur almost surely and are identifiable.[11]

4.2.1 Improvement Principle

The IP benchmarks the performance of Bayesian agents against a heuristic that is simpler to analyze and can be improved upon by rational behavior. The heuristic is based on the idea that an agent always has the option to imitate one of his neighbors and improve upon his outcome. It works as follows. Upon observing who his neighbors are, each agent selects one neighbor to rely on. After observing the action of his chosen neighbor, the agent determines his optimal search policy regardless of what other neighbors have done. The IP holds if: (a) there is a lower bound on the increase in the probability that an agent samples the best action at the first search over his chosen neighbor's probability; this improvement is strict unless the chosen neighbor already samples the best action with probability one at the first search; (b) the learning mechanism captured by such heuristic and the associated improvements lead to asymptotic learning. For condition (a) to hold, it is key that search costs are not bounded away from zero. Condition (ii) requires that, in the network topology: (i) long information paths occur almost surely, so that improvements last until agents sample the best action with probability one at the first search; (ii) long information paths are identifiable, so that agents can single out the correct neighbor to rely on.

To establish these results, I recall some notions on network topologies introduced by Lobel and Sadler (2015), to which I refer for further discussion. The first notion is a connectivity property requiring that agents are linked, directly or indirectly, to an unbounded subset of other agents.

Definition 5. *A network topology* $(\mathbb{B}, \mathcal{F}_\mathbb{B}, \mathbb{Q})$ *features* expanding subnetworks *if, for all positive integers K,*

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{Q}\left(\left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K\right) = 0.$$

The network topology has non-expanding subnetworks *if this property fails.*

A network topology has expending subnetworks if the size of $\hat{B}(n)$ grows without bound as n grows large or, in other words, if arbitrarily long information paths occur almost surely. This condition rules out, for instance, the presence of an excessively influential group of individuals, that is, the existence of infinite subsequences of agents who, with probability bounded away from zero, only observe the choices of the same finite set of individuals.

Definition 6. *Let $(\mathbb{B}, \mathcal{F}_\mathbb{B}, \mathbb{Q})$ be a network topology:*

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[11]Formally, an information path for agent n is a sequence $(\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_k)$ of agents such that $\pi_k = n$ and $\pi_i \in B(\pi_{i+1})$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots k-1\}$.

(a) *A function* $\gamma_n \colon 2^{\mathbb{N}_n} \to \mathbb{N}_n \cup \{0\}$ *is a* neighbor choice function *for agent n if, for all neighborhood realizations* $B_n \in 2^{\mathbb{N}_n}$, *we have* $\gamma_n(B_n) \in B_n$ *when* $B_n \neq \emptyset$, *and* $\gamma_n(B_n) = 0$ *otherwise. Given a neighbor choice function* γ_n, *we say that* $\gamma_n(B_n)$ *is agent n's* chosen neighbor.

(b) *A* chosen neighbor topology, *denoted by* $(\mathbb{B}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathbb{B}}, \mathbb{Q}_{\gamma})$, *is derived from the network topology* $(\mathbb{B}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathbb{B}}, \mathbb{Q})$ *and a sequence of neighbor choice functions* $\gamma \coloneqq (\gamma_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$. *It consists only of the links in* $(\mathbb{B}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathbb{B}}, \mathbb{Q})$ *selected by the sequence of neighbor choice functions* $(\gamma_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$.

In words, a neighbor choice function represents a particular way in which agents select a neighbor. A chosen neighbor topology represents a network topology in which agents discard all observations of the neighbors that are not selected by their neighbor choice function.

The next proposition shows that asymptotic learning via improvements upon imitation occurs if certain conditions (to be soon clarified) hold. For the rest of this subsection, fix a collective search environment $\mathcal{S} \coloneqq \{\mathbb{N}, (Q, \mathcal{F}_Q, \mathbb{P}_Q), (\mathbb{B}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathbb{B}}, \mathbb{Q}), \{(C, \mathcal{F}_C, \mathbb{P}_C), \mathcal{R}\}\}$ and an equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$.

Proposition 2. *Suppose there exist a sequence of neighbor choice functions* $(\gamma_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ *and a continuous, increasing function* $\mathcal{Z} \colon [1/2, 1] \to [1/2, 1]$ *with the following properties:*

(a) *The corresponding chosen neighbor topology features expanding subnetworks;*

(b) $\mathcal{Z}(\beta) > \beta$ *for all* $\beta \in [1/2, 1)$, *and* $\mathcal{Z}(1) = 1$;

(c) *For all* $\varepsilon, \eta > 0$, *there exists a positive integer* $N_{\varepsilon\eta}$ *such that for all* $n > N_{\varepsilon\eta}$, *with probability at least* $1 - \eta$,

$$\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n))\right) > \mathcal{Z}\left(\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_{\gamma_n(B(n))}^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)\right) - \varepsilon. \quad (10)$$

Then, asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium σ.[12]

Importantly, one needs to show that Bayesian agents who do not ignore all but one of the agents in their neighborhood can at least obtain the improvements described by conditions (b) and (c) in Proposition 2. While a Bayesian agent has always a higher probability of *sampling* first the best action than an agent following the heuristic described above, the same conclusion does not hold true for the probability of *taking* the best action. This is so because agents use their information to optimize the value of their sequential search program, which is not equivalent to maximizing the ex ante probability of selecting the best action. For this reason, I consider improvements with respect to $\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x)$, and not with respect to $\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}(a_n \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x)$, although the ultimate interest is in the evolution dynamics of the latter. However, convergence to one of the probability of sampling first the best action is sufficient for asymptotic learning.

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[12]The probabilities in (10) and in (11) below are random variables.

Condition (c) in Proposition 2 requires the existence of a strict lower bound on the increase in the probability that an agent samples first the best action over his chosen neighbor's probability except, possibly, for neighbors that γ_n selects with vanishingly small probability. Therefore, for the IP to hold, one must be able to construct a suitable improvement function $\mathcal{Z}$. The next proposition shows that this is possible if search costs are not bounded away from zero. The intuition goes as follows. Consider an agent, say n, and his chosen neighbor, say $b < n$. Unless b samples the best action with probability one at the first search, b's expected additional gain from the second search is positive. Therefore, if search costs are not bounded away from zero, b samples both actions and compares their quality with positive probability. Thus, as b always takes the best action among those he samples, with positive probability the action b takes is of better quality than the one he samples first. Since n finds it optimal to start searching from the action taken by b,[13] this results in a strict improvement in the probability of sampling the best action at the first search that agent n has over his chosen neighbor b, unless b already does so with probability one.

Proposition 3. *Suppose search costs are not bounded away from zero, and let $(\gamma_n)_{n\in\mathbb{N}}$ be a sequence of neighbor choice functions. Then, there exists an increasing and continuous function $\mathcal{Z}: [1/2, 1] \to [1/2, 1]$, with $\mathcal{Z}(\beta) > \beta$ for all $\beta \in [1/2, 1)$, $\mathcal{Z}(1) = 1$, and such that*

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x\in X} q_x \ \Big| \ \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \geq \mathcal{Z}\left(\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x\in X} q_x \ \Big| \ \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)\right)$$

for all agents n and b with $0 \leq b < n$.

Besides serving as a proof technique when standard informational monotonicity properties do not hold (cf. Section 3.3), the IP also acts as a learning principle. In particular, the IP captures the idea that improvements upon imitation—a boundedly rational procedure— are sufficient for positive learning outcomes. Acemoglu et al. (2011) and Lobel and Sadler (2015) develop an IP for the SSLM as a tool to establish positive learning results in stochastic networks. My results extend the scope of the IP to a new informational environment, which departs from that of the SSLM in three fundamental ways. First, private information is different in kind: here, sampling an action perfectly reveals its own quality only, whereas in the SSLM agents receive imperfect signals about the actions' relative quality. Second, private information is generated by equilibrium play rather than being exogenously available: agents choose what to learn about and when to stop acquiring information. Third, the inferential challenge differs: agents maximize the value of a sequential information acquisition program rather than the probability of matching a state of nature or an ex ante expected utility. In spite of this limited comparability to the SSLM, however, improvements upon imitation are a powerful learning principle also in collective search environments.

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[13]It is intuitive, and formally proven in Appendix B.1, that, when agent n only relies on agent b disregarding what other agents have done, the marginal distribution of the quality of the action taken by b first-order stochastically dominates the marginal distribution of the quality of the other action in the eyes of n.

4.2.2 Sufficient Conditions for Asymptotic Learning

To connect Propositions 2 and 3 into a general result, one needs to bound the difference between $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s^1_{\gamma_n} \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x)$ and $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s^1_{\gamma_n} \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n)$. Agent n can imitate agent γ_n only if $\gamma_n \in B(n)$. Therefore, if neighborhoods are correlated, agent γ_n's probability of sampling first the best action conditional on agent n observing agent γ_n is not the same as agent γ_n's probability of sampling first the best action. That is, by imitation, agent n earns γ_n's probability of sampling first the best action *conditional* on n choosing to imitate agent γ_n. If $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s^1_{\gamma_n} \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x)$ and $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s^1_{\gamma_n} \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n)$ are approximately the same for large n, then Propositions 2 and 3 immediately imply asymptotic learning. In other words, long information paths must be identifiable, in the sense that agents along the path need reasonably accurate information about the network realization. The next theorem formalizes this last step, which is standard from prior work (see, in particular, Golub and Sadler (2016)).

Theorem 1. *Let a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$ and an equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ be given. Suppose that the following two conditions hold:*

(a) The search technology has search costs that are not bounded away from zero;

(b) In the network topology there exists a sequence of neighbor choice functions $(\gamma_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ such that the corresponding chosen neighbor topology features expanding subnetworks, and for all $\varepsilon, \eta > 0$, there exists a positive integer N_ε such that for all $n > N_\varepsilon$, with probability at least $1 - \eta$,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s^1_{\gamma_n(B(n))} \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n))\right) > \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s^1_{\gamma_n(B(n))} \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) - \varepsilon. \quad (11)$$

Then, asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium σ.

A variety of specific conditions on the network topology of $\mathcal{S}$ ensure that (11) holds in every equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ (I refer to Acemoglu et al. (2011) and Lobel and Sadler (2015) for such conditions). In such cases, if search costs are not bounded away from zero and there exists a chosen neighbor topology with expanding subnetworks, we say that asymptotic learning occurs in the collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$.

MFP show that search costs that are not bounded away from zero are sufficient for asymptotic learning in the complete network. By Theorem 1, this insight is much broader: it holds in *all* sufficiently connected networks in which information paths are identifiable. Partial and stochastic observability of past histories considerably changes the analysis. Yet, these complications allow me to identify improvements upon imitation as key learning principle in collective search environments.

4.3 Necessary Conditions on Network Topologies

Connectedness. Asymptotic learning requires that agents observe, directly or indirectly, the choices of an unbounded subset of other agents. Thus, even if search costs are not bounded away from zero, asymptotic learning fails with non-expanding subnetworks.

Proposition 4. *Let $\mathcal{S}$ be a collective search environment in which the network topology has non-expanding subnetworks. Then, there exists no equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ with asymptotic learning.*

The idea behind Proposition 4 is simple. Asymptotic learning requires that the probability of no agent in $\hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}$ sampling both actions converges to zero as n goes to infinity. Otherwise, there would be a subsequence of agents who, with probability bounded away from zero: (i) only observe (directly or indirectly) agents who do not compare the quality of the two actions; (ii) do not make this comparison either. Learning would trivially fail because no agent in the subsequence conclusively assesses the relative quality of the two actions. Now suppose that the network topology has non-expanding subnetworks. By Assumption 1 and the characterization of equilibrium search policies, each single agent, with or without neighbors, does not search for the second action with positive probability independently of which action he samples first. Since non-expanding subnetworks generate with positive probability an infinite subsequence of agents, say $\mathcal{N}$, with finite personal subnetwork, the probability of no agent in $\hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}$ sampling both actions remains bounded away from zero for the agents in $\mathcal{N}$. As a result, asymptotic learning fails.

The negative result obtains because infinitely many agents remain uninformed about the relative quality of the two actions with positive probability. The society may well have infinitely many perfectly informed agents, but the result of their searches does not spread over the network.

Identifiability of Information Paths. In the spirit of Lobel and Sadler (2015), it is possible to construct examples in which asymmetric information about the overall network disrupts the IP. In such cases, asymptotic learning via improvements upon imitation fails even if the network is well connected and search costs are bounded away from zero.

5 Maximal Learning

In this section, I focus on search costs that are bounded away from zero. First, I define maximal learning, which is the other learning metric considered in the paper. Second, I explain why the IP breaks down when search costs are bounded away from zero. Third, I characterize a large class of network topologies in which maximal learning fails when search costs are bounded away from zero. By means of an example, however, I show that maximal learning obtains in some special network structures despite search costs that are

bounded away from zero. Finally, I argue that large-sample and martingale convergence arguments are of little use in the search setting I study.

5.1 Maximal Learning: Definition

When search costs are bounded away from zero, information acquisition may be precluded even to agents with the best search opportunities (the lowest search cost type) and the strongest incentives to explore (no social information). In such cases, asymptotic learning necessarily fails, and so it is not the correct learning benchmark, as the next example shows.

Example 1. Suppose that the qualities of the two actions are uniform draws from $\{0, 1/2, 1\}$ and that the lowest cost in the support of the search cost distribution is $\underline{c} > 1/6$. With probability $2/9$, the realized quality of the two actions is $(q_0, q_1) \in \{(1/2, 1), (1, 1/2)\}$. In such cases, in equilibrium an agent with no neighbors and search cost type $\underline{c}$ never samples the second alternative whatever action he samples first, as his expected additional gain from the second search is at most $1/3(1 - 1/2) = 1/6$, which is smaller than his search cost. However, this agent only samples the best action at the first search with probability $1/2$. In turn, agents with a higher search cost type and/or nonempty neighborhood do not sample the second action either, independently of which action they sample first (see Section 3.2). Therefore, when $(q_0, q_1) \in \{(1/2, 1), (1, 1/2)\}$, each agent in the social network makes the wrong choice with positive probability. ∎

Let $\underline{c} \geq 0$ be the lowest cost in the support of the search cost distribution of the collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$. Define the threshold quality $q(\underline{c}) := \inf\{q \in Q : t^\emptyset(q) < \underline{c}\}$, and let

$$\overline{\Omega}(\underline{c}) := \{\omega := (q_0, q_1) \in \Omega : q_i \geq q(\underline{c}) \text{ for } i = 0, 1\}.$$

Consider an *expert*—an agent with search cost type $\underline{c}$ and no social information—who wishes to select the best action in X. The expert samples both actions whenever the action he samples first has quality lower than $q(\underline{c})$. Thus, since $\omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$ if and only if $\min\{q_0, q_1\} < q(\underline{c})$, the expert always takes the best action when $\omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$. In contrast, the expert never searches twice when $\omega \in \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$; in such case, the expert takes the best action only if he samples it at the first search. With the next definition, I introduce the notion of maximal learning, which obtains if agents asymptotically select the best action with the same ex ante probability as an expert.

Definition 7. *Let a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$ and an equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_\mathcal{S}$ be given. Maximal learning occurs in equilibrium σ if*

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(a_n \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})\right) = 1. \tag{12}$$

When search costs are not bounded away from zero, maximal learning reduces to asymptotic learning. In contrast, when search costs are bounded away from zero, maximal

and asymptotic learning may or may not coincide. Example 1 suggests that the two notions are distinct. However, this is not always true. Suppose the qualities of the two actions are uniform draws from $\{0, 1\}$, and $\underline{c} < 1/2$. In this case, maximal and asymptotic learning coincide, as an expert with search cost type $\underline{c}$ samples the second action whenever the first action sampled has quality 0. In general, maximal learning is a weaker requirement than asymptotic learning; it represents the best outcome a society can aim for when search costs are bounded away from zero.

The next assumption parallels Assumption 1 and is maintained throughout Section 5.

Assumption 2 (**Non-Trivial Collective Search Environment Conditional on** $\omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$)**.** *There exists $\tilde{q}$ in the support of $\mathbb{P}_Q$ such that:*

(a) $\mathbb{P}_Q(\tilde{q} < q < q(\underline{c})) > 0$;

(b) $1 - F_C\big(t^{\emptyset}(\tilde{q})\big) > 0$. *That is, the distribution of search costs is such that, with positive probability, an agent with empty neighborhood does not sample another action when the first action sampled has quality $\tilde{q}$ or higher.*

Assumption 2 rules out uninteresting learning problems in which agents with no neighbors always sample both actions when $\omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$. If this assumption fails, asymptotic learning trivially obtains for $\omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$, and never obtains otherwise.

5.2   Failure of the Improvement Principle

Search costs that are bounded away from zero disrupt the IP, as improvements upon imitation are precluded to late moving agents. Therefore, asymptotic and maximal learning via the IP fail.

To formalize the argument, consider a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$ in which $\underline{c} > 0$. Suppose $\omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$ and, by way of contradiction, that the IP holds. Then, there must be a chosen neighbor topology in which the probability that none of the agents in $\hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}$ samples both actions converges to zero as n grows large. Thus, there must be an infinite subsequence of agents $\mathcal{N}$ where, for a sufficiently late moving agent $m \in \mathcal{N}$, this probability is so small that the expected additional gain from the second search falls below $\underline{c} > 0$, and remains below this threshold afterward. As a result, no agent in $\mathcal{N}$ moving after agent m will sample the second action. However, by Assumption 2, the probability that none of the agents in $\hat{B}(m) \cup \{m\}$ samples both actions is positive for any finite m. This is a contradiction, as then the probability that none of the agents in $\hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}$ samples both actions remains bounded away from zero for the infinite subsequence of agents $\mathcal{N}$.

In the SSLM, the most informative private signals, whether bounded or not, are transmitted via the IP throughout well-connected networks with identifiable information paths. Therefore, in such networks, societies that rely on improvements upon imitation perform as well as a single agent with no social information who has access to the strongest private signals. In contrast, in collective search environments, a perturbation of the search

technology disrupts the IP: if search costs are bounded away from zero, societies that rely only on improvements upon imitation perform worse than a single agent with no social information who has access to the lowest search costs—at least from the viewpoint of the probability of taking the best action.

The IP is not the only learning principle. In Section 5.4, I inquire whether there exist network topologies in which maximal learning always fails—no matter what agents may do in order to learn—when search costs are bounded away from zero. In Section 5.5, in contrast, I inquire whether there exist some network topology and some learning principle under which maximal learning obtains despite search costs that are bounded away from zero.

5.3 OIP Networks

I now define a class of network topologies which will be extensively discussed in the rest of Section 5 and in Section 6. For all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $l_n \in \mathbb{N}_n$, let $B_n^{l_n} := \{k \in \mathbb{N}_n : k \geq n - l_n\}$ be the subset of $\mathbb{N}_n$ comprising the l_n immediate predecessors of n. For instance: if $l_n = 1$, then $B_n^1 = \{n - 1\}$; if $l_n = n - 1$, then $B_n^{n-1} = \{1, \ldots, n - 1\}$.

Definition 8. *A network topology* $(\mathbb{B}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathbb{B}}, \mathbb{Q})$ *features* observation of immediate predecessors *if, for all* $n \in \mathbb{N}$,
$$\mathbb{Q}\Big(\cup_{l_n \in \mathbb{N}_n} \big(B(n) = B_n^{l_n} \big) \Big) = 1.$$

I will often refer to network topologies featuring observation of immediate predecessors as *OIP networks*. OIP networks represent a large class of network structures, ranging from deterministic network topologies to stochastic networks with rich correlation patterns between neighborhoods.

Example 2. Here are some examples of OIP networks.

1. If $\mathbb{Q}(B(n) = B_n^{n-1}) = 1$ for all n, we have the complete network.

2. If $\mathbb{Q}(B(n) = B_n^1) = 1$ for all n, we have the network topology in which each agent only observes his immediate predecessor.

3. As an example of stochastic network with independent neighborhoods, consider the following: for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\mathbb{Q}_n(B(n) = B_n^1) = (n-1)/n$ and $\mathbb{Q}_n(B(n) = B_n^{n-1}) = 1/n$. In this case, agents either observe their immediate predecessor, or all of them, with the latter event becoming less and less likely as n grows large.

4. Stochastic networks with correlated neighborhoods are also possible. For instance: $\mathbb{Q}(B(2) = \{1\}) = 1$, $\mathbb{Q}(B(3) = \{2\}) = 1/2 = \mathbb{Q}(B(3) = \{1, 2\})$, and, for all $n > 3$,

$$B(n) = \begin{cases} \{n - 1\} & \text{if } B_3 = \{2\} \\ \{1, \ldots, n - 1\} & \text{if } B_3 = \{1, 2\} \end{cases}.$$

Here, every agent observes only his immediate predecessor or all his predecessors, depending on agent 2's neighborhood realization. ■

5.4 Failure of Maximal Learning

When search costs are bounded away from zero, maximal learning fails in many deterministic and stochastic network topologies.

Theorem 2. *Let $\mathcal{S}$ be a collective search environment in which the search technology has search costs that are bounded away from zero and the network topology satisfies one of the following conditions:*

(a) Observation of immediate predecessors;

(b) $\mathbb{Q}(|B(n)| \leq 1) = 1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ (e.g, random sampling of one agent from the past). Then, there exists no equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ with maximal learning.

Theorem 2 characterizes a class of networks in which search costs that are not bounded away from zero are necessary and sufficient for asymptotic learning. In such networks, positive learning results are fragile with respect to perturbations in the search technology: if we remove zero from the support of the search cost distribution, not only asymptotic learning fails, but also the second best outcome (maximal learning) breaks down. That is, learning fails discontinuously with respect to its benchmark metric.

The intuition behind Theorem 2 is simple. In networks satisfying the conditions of the theorem, rational behavior coincide with imitation as captured by the IP. Therefore, as the IP fails when search costs are bounded away from zero (see Section 5.2), so does rational learning.

The negative result extends beyond the networks in Theorem 2. For instance, maximal learning fails in OIP networks if, in addition, agents observe the choices of the first K agents or the aggregate history of prior actions (see Sections 6.1 and 6.4); it also fails when each agent n samples $M > 1$ agents uniformly and independently from $\{1, \ldots, n-1\}$.

5.5 Maximal Learning and the Large-Sample Principle

In the SSLM, Acemoglu et al. (2011) (see their Theorem 4) characterize a broad class of stochastic networks in which asymptotic learning obtains with bounded private beliefs. Their findings suggest that maximal learning might occur in some networks despite search costs that are bounded away from zero. The next example shows that this intuition is correct in some very special cases.

Example 3. Let $\mathcal{S}$ be a collective search environment in which the lowest cost in the support of the search cost distribution is $\underline{c} > 0$. Assume that the network topology satisfies, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\mathbb{Q}(B(n) = \emptyset) = p_n \qquad \text{and} \qquad \mathbb{Q}(B(n) = \{m \in \mathbb{N}_n : B(m) = \emptyset\}) = 1 - p_n,$$

where the sequence $(p_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is such that $0 \leq p_n \leq 1$ for all n, $\lim_{n \to \infty} p_n = 0$, and

$\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} p_n = \infty$. That is, agent n has empty neighborhood with probability p_n, or observes all and only his predecessors with empty neighborhood with probability $1 - p_n$.

Suppose $(q_0, q_1) \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$ and, without loss, $q_0 > q_1$. Conside an agent k with $B(k) = \emptyset$. By definition of $\overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$ and $\underline{c}$, k samples the second action with positive probability when he samples action 1 first. Hence, k takes the best action ($a_k = 0$) with probability $\alpha > 1/2$.[14]

Now consider an agent l with $B(l) \neq \emptyset$. By the assumptions on the network topology, agent l only observes the choices of all his predecessors with empty neighborhood. Thus, l's optimal decision at the first search stage depends on the relative fraction of choices he observes. In particular:

$$s_l^1 = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \left|\hat{B}(l, 0)\right| > \left|\hat{B}(l, 1)\right| \\ 1 & \text{if } \left|\hat{B}(l, 0)\right| < \left|\hat{B}(l, 1)\right| \end{cases},$$

and $s_l^1 \in \Delta(\{0, 1\})$ if $|\hat{B}(l, 0)| = |\hat{B}(l, 1)|$. To see this, note that $|\hat{B}(l, x)| > |\hat{B}(l, \neg x)|$ immediately implies $P_l(x) < P_l(\neg x)$, where $P_l(\cdot)$ is the probability defined by (4).

The assumptions on $(p_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ imply that $\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{Q}(|\hat{B}(n)| < K) = 0$ for all positive integers K. Hence, with probability one, there are infinitely many agents with no social information. Moreover, the actions taken by the agents with empty neighborhood form a sequence of independent random variables. Thus, by the weak law of large numbers, the ratio $|\hat{B}(l, 0)|/|\hat{B}(l, 0)|$ converges in probability to $\alpha > 1/2$ as $l \to \infty$ (with respect to $\mathbb{P}_\sigma$, and conditional on $\hat{B}(l) \neq \emptyset$). Therefore,

$$\lim_{l \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\left|\hat{B}(l, 0)\right| > \left|\hat{B}(l, 1)\right| \;\middle|\; \hat{B}(l) \neq \emptyset\right) = 1. \tag{13}$$

Finally, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, note that

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &\geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\middle|\; \omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})\right) \\ &= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\middle|\; B(n) = \emptyset, \omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})\right) \mathbb{Q}(B(n) = \emptyset) \\ &\quad + \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\middle|\; B(n) \neq \emptyset, \omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})\right) \mathbb{Q}(B(n) \neq \emptyset) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} p_n + \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\left|\hat{B}(n, 0)\right| > \left|\hat{B}(n, 1)\right| \;\middle|\; \hat{B}(l) \neq \emptyset\right)(1 - p_n). \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

Here: the equality holds by the law of total probability; the last inequality follows by the properties of the network topology, the fact that $q_0 > q_1$, the assumption that agents with no neighbors select uniformly at random the action to sample first, and the optimal policy at the first search stage for agents with nonempty neighborhood.

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[14]Agent k takes the best action any time he samples first action 0, which occurs with probability $1/2$, and any time he samples first action 1 and his search cost is smaller that $t^\emptyset(q_1)$. Since $q_0 > q_1$ and $(q_0, q_1) \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$, $q_1 < q(\underline{c})$, and so the latter event occurs with positive probability. Therefore, the overall probability that agent k takes action 0 is larger than $1/2$. Providing an expression for α is irrelevant for the argument.

By (13), and since $\lim_{n\to\infty} p_n = 0$, we have

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} \left[\frac{1}{2}p_n + \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\left|\hat{B}(l,0)\right| > \left|\hat{B}(l,1)\right|\right)(1-p_n) \right] = 1. \tag{15}$$

Together, (14) and (15) imply

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x\in X} q_x \ \Big| \ \omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c}) \right) = 1,$$

showing that maximal learning occurs. ∎

The positive result in Example 3 obtains because agents with nonempty neighborhood observe *only* agents with no social information. Under this premise, the optimal policy at the first search stage for the former group of agents is determined by the relative fraction of choices they observe. When agents with nonempty neighborhood observe more, however, connecting the optimal search policy to the ratio of observed choices is no longer possible. Therefore, the insight of Example 3 cannot be extended to a more general characterization.

The positive results in Acemoglu et al. (2011) hold in a much broader class of stochastic network topologies. In these topologies, there is an infinite subset of agents S that forms the core of the network. Within this core S, there are two important subgroups: (i) an infinite but proportionally vanishing subgroup of agents who act based (partially) on their signals; (ii) a subgroup of agents who observe the entire history of play. Agents in the first subgroup bring new information into the society. Agents in the second subgroup collect the information brought in by the agents in the first subgroup; by the martingale convergence theorem, the social belief of these agents converges with probability 1 to the correct state of the world. Finally, the network topology has expanding observations with respect to S. This guarantees that information spreads to all other agents via the IP. Therefore, these agents also asymptotically learn the state in equilibrium.

There are two major impediments to extend Acemoglu et al. (2011)'s reasoning to my setting. First, Acemoglu et al. (2011) make an extensive use of large-sample and martingale convergence arguments, which are commonly referred to as the *large-sample principle*, (hereafter LSP). The LSP captures the idea that agents learn by aggregating the information contained in a large sample of others' choices. Large-sample and martingale convergence arguments, however, have no bite in collective search environments (see Remark 2 in Section 3.2.2). Thus, in my setting the scope of the LSP remains limited to trivial cases (such as the one in Example 3). Second when search costs are bounded away from zero, improvements upon imitation are precluded to late moving agents; thus, societies that rely on the IP perform worse than an expert (see Section 5.2).

Maximal and asymptotic learning sometimes coincide despite search costs are bounded away from zero (see Section 5.1). Thus, Example 3 also shows that search costs that are not bounded away from zero are not, in general, necessary for asymptotic learning.

6 Rate of Convergence, Welfare, and Efficiency

In this section, I present results on the speed and efficiency of social learning, on the probability of wrong herds, and discuss simple policy interventions to increase equilibrium welfare. Part of the analysis focuses on OIP networks, so I begin by sketching equilibrium behavior in such networks.

6.1 Equilibrium Strategies in OIP Networks

Before describing equilibrium strategies in OIP networks, I introduce some terminology.

Definition 9. *Let $\mathcal{S}$ be a collective search environment in which the network topology features observation of immediate predecessors, and let $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$. We say:*

(a) *Action $x \in X$ is* revealed to be inferior to agent n *in equilibrium σ if there exist agents $j, j + 1 \in B(n)$ such that $a_j = x$ and $a_{j+1} = \neg x$.*

(b) *Action $x \in X$ is* revealed to be inferior by time n *in equilibrium σ if there exist agents $j, j + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$, with $j + 1 < n$, such that $a_j = x$ and $a_{j+1} = \neg x$.*

(c) *Action $x \in X$ is* inferior by time n *in equilibrium σ if there exists an agent $j \in \mathbb{N}$, with $j < n$, who has sampled both actions and such that $a_j = \neg x$.*

If an action is revealed to be inferior to agent n, then it is also revealed to be inferior by time n. The converse statement is not generally true, but it is so in the complete network.

Equilibrium Strategies in OIP Networks.

Let $n \geq 2$. Agent n's equilibrium strategy is the following (see Appendix B.3 for the formal characterization). At the first search stage, agent n samples the action taken by his immediate predecessor: $s_n^1 = a_{n-1}$. Hence, if an action is revealed to be inferior by time n, it is also inferior by time n. The converse statement is not generally true.

At the second search stage, the optimal policy depends on whether action $\neg s_n^1$ is revealed to be inferior to agent n or not.

- If action $\neg s_n^1$ is revealed to be inferior to agent n, then n discontinues search and takes action s_n^1. The reason for not sampling $\neg s_n^1$ is straightforward. Suppose there are agents $j, j + 1 \in B(n)$ such that $a_j = \neg s_n^1$ and $a_{j+1} = s_n^1$. Since each agent samples first the action taken by his immediate predecessor, agent $j + 1$ must have sampled action $\neg s_n^1$ first, and therefore would only select $a_{j+1} = s_n^1$ at the choice stage if he then sampled action s_n^1 as well, and $q_{s_n^1} \geq q_{\neg s_n^1}$. That is, action $\neg s_n^1$ is revealed to be inferior to action s_n^1 by agent $j + 1$'s choice, and so the expected additional gain from the second search is zero.

- If action $\neg s_n^1$ is not revealed to be inferior to agent n, the expected additional gain from the second search given quality $q_{s_n^1}$ is the same as in the complete network for an action of the same quality that is not revealed to be inferior by time n. The

intuition goes as follows. In all OIP networks, agent n's personal subnetwork is $\{1, \ldots, n-1\}$, which coincides with agent n's neighborhood in the complete network. Moreover, each agent samples first the action taken by their immediate predecessor. Thus, given $q_{s_n^1}$, the probability that none of the agents in n's personal subnetwork relative to s_n^1 has sampled both actions must be the same. But then, if s_n^1 is not revealed to be inferior to agent n, agent n adopts the same threshold he would use in the complete network to determine whether to search further after sampling an action of the same quality that is not revealed to be inferior by time n.

Remark 3. Fix a state process and a search technology. By the previous argument, the following equilibrium objects are identical across OIP networks: the order of search; the cutoff for sampling a second action that is not revealed to be inferior to an agent; the probability that each agent n selects the best action. Then, in OIP networks:

(a) Network transparency, the density of connections, and their correlation pattern do not affect agents' inference and several equilibrium outcomes. In particular: the probability of wrong herds is the same as in the complete network; if search costs are not bounded away from zero, so that asymptotic learning occurs, the rate of convergence is the same as in the complete network.

(b) Actions are improving: each agent takes a weakly better action than his predecessors.[15]

These properties distinguish the search environment I study from the SSLM, where equilibrium dynamics dramatically change as the number of immediate predecessors that are observed varies. For instance, Celen and Kariv (2004) study the SSLM under the assumption that each agent only observes his most recent predecessor's action and show that beliefs and actions cycle indefinitely.

6.2 Rate of Convergence and Probability of Wrong Herds

Rate of converge. I begin by introducing a property of search cost distributions that will affect the results on the rate of convergence.

Definition 10. *Let* $(Q, \mathcal{F}_Q, \mathbb{P}_Q)$ *be a state process and* $\{(C, \mathcal{F}_C, \mathbb{P}_C), \mathcal{R}\}$ *a search technology. Set* $\underline{q} := \min \operatorname{supp}\left(\mathbb{P}_Q\right)$. *The search cost distribution has* polynomial shape *if there exist some real constants* K *and* L, *with* $K \geq 0$ *and* $0 < L < \frac{2^{K+1}}{(K+2)t^{\emptyset}\left(\underline{q}\right)^K}$, *such that*

$$F_C(c) \geq Lc^K \qquad \forall\ c \in \left(0, t^{\emptyset}\left(\underline{q}\right)/2\right).$$

Convergence to the best action is faster than a polynomial rate in OIP networks and faster than a logarithmic rate under uniform random sampling of one agent from the

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[15]This property is lost in general network topologies, in which agents may generate long patterns of disagreement before settling on one action. Disagreement, however, does not necessarily have negative welfare implications, as it may foster exploration and speed up convergence to the right action.

past. Thus, the speed of learning is slower under uniform random sampling of one agent from the past than in OIP networks. Intuitively, this is so because the cardinality of agents' personal subnetworks grows at a slower rate than in OIP networks, and so does the probability that at least one agent in the personal subnetworks has sampled both actions.

Proposition 5. *Suppose that search costs are not bounded away from zero and that the search cost distribution has polynomial shape.*

(a) *If the network topology features observation of immediate predecessors, then, in any equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$,*

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma \left(s_n^1 \notin \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \right) = O\left(\frac{1}{n^{\frac{1}{K+1}}} \right).$$

(b) *If the network topology has independent neighborhoods and $\mathbb{Q}_n(B(n) = \{b\}) = 1/(n-1)$ for all $b \in \mathbb{N}_n$, then, in any equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$,*

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma \left(s_n^1 \notin \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \right) = O\left(\frac{1}{(\log n)^{\frac{1}{K+1}}} \right).$$

To prove the previous results, I build on a technique developed by Lobel, Acemoglu, Dahleh and Ozdaglar (2009) to characterize the speed of learning in the SSLM. This technique consists in approximating a lower bound on the rate of convergence with an ordinary differential equation.

Probability of Wrong Herds. In OIP networks and under uniform random sampling of one agent from the past, we can bound the probability of suboptimal herds as a linear function of the lowest cost in the support of the search cost distribution.

Proposition 6. *Let $\mathcal{S}$ be a collective search environment in which the network topology either features observation of immediate predecessors or has independent neighborhoods with $\mathbb{Q}_n(B(n) = \{b\}) = 1/(n-1)$ for all $b \in \mathbb{N}_n$. Moreover, let $\underline{c}$ be the lowest cost in the support of $\mathbb{P}_C$. Then, in any equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$,*

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma \left(a_n^1 \notin \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \right) \leq \underline{c} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q} \left[\frac{1}{t^\emptyset(q_0)} \,\middle|\, q_0 < q_1 \right].$$

By Proposition 6, the probability that agents asymptotically select the best action converges to one as $\underline{c}$ approaches zero. Despite this "continuity" result, however, the probability of wrong herds may remain sizable if search costs are bounded away from zero. This is so even when maximal and asymptotic learning coincide, as the next example shows.

Example 4. Consider an OIP network. Assume that the qualities of the two actions are drawn uniformly at random from $\{0, 1\}$, and that search costs are drawn from $\{1/2, 2/3\}$, with $\mathbb{P}_C(c = 1/2) = \delta$ and $\mathbb{P}_C(c = 2/3) = 1 - \delta$ for some $\delta \in (0, 1)$. For an agent with no

neighbors, the expected additional gain from a second search after sampling an action of quality 0 is $1/2 = \underline{c}$. Thus, maximal and asymptotic learning coincide, as an expert would always select the best action.

With probability $1/2$, $(q_0, q_1) \in \{(0,1), (1,0)\}$. If so, agent 1 selects the best action with probability $(1 + \delta)/2$. Thus, the ex ante probability that agent 1 selects a wrong action is $(1 - \delta)/4$. Moreover, the expected additional gain from a second search for agents $n \geq 2$ after sampling an action of quality 0 is smaller than $1/2 = \underline{c}$, as agent 1 samples both actions with positive probability. Therefore, no agent moving after agent 1 samples both action. Thus, a suboptimal herd forms whenever agent 1 selects the wrong action. As δ approaches zero, the latter event occurs with probability arbitrarily close to $1/4$. $\blacksquare$

6.3   Equilibrium Welfare and Efficiency in OIP Networks

In this section, I first characterize how network transparency affects equilibrium welfare. Then, I compare equilibrium welfare against the efficiency benchmark in which a single decision maker takes all actions. To aid analysis, I assume $\mathbb{P}_C$ admits density f_C with $f_C(\underline{c}) > 0$.

Equilibrium Welfare across OIP Networks. Equilibrium welfare is not the same across OIP networks. To see this, suppose there exist agents $j, j + 1$ such that $a_j = x$ and $a_{j+1} = \neg x$. Therefore, action x is revealed to be inferior by time $j + 2$ in equilibrium. In the complete network, action x is revealed to be inferior to any agent $n \geq j + 2$, and so it is never sampled again. In other OIP networks, instead, agent j is not necessarily in the neighborhood of agent $n \geq j + 2$, and therefore n fails to realize from agent $j + 1$'s choice that action x is of lower quality than action $\neg x$. Thus, agent n inefficiently samples action x with positive probability at the second search stage.[16]

Inefficient duplication of costly search is more severe the shorter in the past agents can observe. Hence, the complete network is the most efficient OIP network, and the network in which agents only observe their most recent predecessor is the least efficient in this class. In all other OIP networks, equilibrium welfare is comprised between these two bounds.

The next proposition shows that welfare losses arising because agents fail to recognize actions that are revealed to be inferior by the time of their move only vanish in arbitrarily patient societies (equivalently, in the long run). These losses, however, remain significant in the short and medium run. To ease the statement of the result, let $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{S}'$ be two collective search environments with identical state process and search technology. Suppose the network topology of $\mathcal{S}$ is the complete network and that in $\mathcal{S}'$ agents only observe their immediate predecessor. Assume that future payoffs are discounted at rate $\delta \in (0, 1)$.

Proposition 7. *For all $\delta \in (0, 1)$, the average social utility in equilibrium σ is larger than the average social utility in equilibrium σ'. This difference vanishes as δ goes to one.*

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[16]For the descriptive analysis in this section, assume that search costs are not bounded away from zero. The formal details are in Appendix B.6.

Single Decision Maker Benchmark. Suppose agents are replaced by a single decision maker who draws a new search cost in each period and faces the same connections' structure as the agents in the society. The single decision maker discounts future payoffs at rate $\delta \in (0, 1)$, internalizes future gains of today's search, and needs to sample each of the two actions exactly once along the same information path. In OIP networks, each agent is (directly or indirectly) linked to all his predecessors, and so all agents lie on the same information path. Hence, the single decision maker achieves the same average social utility in all OIP networks.[17]

Equilibrium behavior in OIP networks gives rise to two sources of inefficiency:

(i) The single decision maker internalizes future gains of today's search, whereas agents are myopic. As a result, exploration and convergence to the right action are too slow in equilibrium.

(ii) The single decision maker samples each action only once. By contrast, in equilibrium:

   (a) Each agent n fails to recognize an action, say x, that is inferior, and not revealed to be so, by time n. Therefore, agents sample action x multiple times.

   (b) Each agent n fails to recognize an action, say x, that is revealed to be inferior by time n, i.e. such that $a_j = x$ and $a_{j+1} = \neg x$ for some agents $j, j+1$, with $j + 1 < n$, unless $j \in B(n)$. Again, agents sample action x multiple times.

As a result, equilibrium behavior displays inefficient duplication of costly search. Note that, while (a) occurs in all OIP networks, (b) does not in the complete network.

Equilibrium welfare losses disappear in the long run if and only if asymptotic learning occurs. If search costs are bounded away from zero, or if the focus is on short- and medium-run outcomes, however, the average social utility in equilibrium is lower than under the single decision maker benchmark and welfare losses can be significant.

Proposition 8. *Let $\mathcal{S}''$ be collective search environment in which the network topology features observation of immediate predecessors. Then, the average social utility in any equilibrium $\sigma'' \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}''}$ converges to the average social utility implemented by the single decision maker as δ goes to one if and only if search costs are not bounded away from zero.*

Discussion of Rate of Convergence, Probability of Wrong Herds, and Welfare.
   The results in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 are noteworthy for two reasons. First, in OIP networks the rate of convergence, the probability of wrong herds, and the long-run welfare are independent of network transparency, the density of connections, and their correlation pattern. Second, the rate of convergence can be characterized for all such networks. By contrast, for the SSLM little is known about convergence rates unless all agents observe the most recent action, a random action from the past, or all past actions (see Lobel et al. (2009), Rosenberg and Vieille (2018), and Hann-Caruthers, Martynov and Tamuz (2018)).[18]

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[17]See MFP for the solution to the single decision maker's problem in the complete network. As the single decision maker's problem is the same in all OIP networks, their analysis applies unchanged to my setting.

[18]For the speed of rational learning, see also Vives (1993) and Harel, Mossel, Strack and Tamuz (2018).

Rosenberg and Vieille (2018) measure efficiency in the SSLM by the expectation of the total welfare loss, which is equal to the total number of incorrect choices under a 0-1 loss function, and define learning to be efficient if the expected welfare loss is finite. (see also Hann-Caruthers et al. (2018)). They focus on two polar setups assuming that each agent either observes the entire sequence of earlier actions or only the previous one. In a similar spirit with my results, they find that whether learning is efficient is independent of the setup: for every signal distribution, learning is efficient in one setup if and only if it is efficient in the other one. In my setting, the results on the irrelevance of how far in the past agents can observe is much stronger: first, it holds for the long-run welfare as well as for the probability of wrong herds and the rate of convergence; second, it neither depends on the number of immediate predecessors that agents observe nor on the density and the dependence structure among connections.

6.4   Policy Interventions

Reducing network transparency in OIP networks leads to inefficient duplication of costly search. Simple policy interventions, however, improve efficiency and equilibrium welfare.

Let $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{S}'$ be two collective search environments with identical state process and search technology. Assume $\mathcal{S}$ is endowed with the complete network, and let $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$. Suppose $\mathcal{S}'$ is endowed with any OIP network and that each agent in $\mathcal{S}'$, in addition to the actions of his neighbors, observes the aggregate history of past actions or the action of the first agent (or both). Let σ' be an equilibrium of the game associated to $\mathcal{S}'$. Then, we have the following.

Proposition 9. *For all $\delta \in (0,1)$, the average social utility in equilibrium σ' is the same as the average social utility in equilibrium σ.*

Equilibrium welfare in OIP networks is the same as in the complete network (the most efficient OIP network) if agents observe, in addition to their neighbors' actions, the aggregate history of past actions or the action of the first agent. The intuition behind the result is simple. First, observing the action of the first agent or the aggregate history of past actions (or both) does not change equilibrium behavior at the first search stage: in σ', each agent samples first the action taken by his immediate predecessor. Second, if an action is revealed to be inferior by time n in equilibrium σ', that action is never sampled again by any agent $m \geq n$. To see this, suppose that there exist agents $j, j+1 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $a_j = x$ and $a_{j+1} = \neg x$, and consider any agent $n > j+1$. Agent n samples first action a_{n-1}. Since each agent samples first the action taken by his immediate predecessor and takes the action of better quality, it must be that $a_{n-1} = \neg x$. Now, if agent n observes the choice of the first agent or the aggregate history of past actions, he realizes that $q_{\neg x} \geq q_x$ even when $j \notin B(n)$. In fact, when n observes $a_1 = x$ and $a_{n-1} = \neg x$, he correctly infers that some agent $j+1$, with $1 \leq j \leq n-2$, has sampled both actions and discarded the inferior action x. Therefore, n stops searching and takes action $\neg x$. The same inference is possible when agent n observes

the aggregate history of past choices. In this case, n would observe that j agents have taken action x, while $n-j-1$ agents have taken action $\neg x$. Together with $a_{n-1} = \neg x$, this implies that $a_1 = x$ and that some agent $j+1$, with $1 \le j \le n-2$, has sampled both actions and discarded the inferior action x. Therefore, the duplication of costly search that would arise because agents fail to recognize actions that are revealed to be inferior by time n disappears.

Interestingly, the simple policy interventions that this section suggests are commonly observed in practice. For instance, online platforms that aggregate past individual choices by sorting different items according to their popularity or sales rank serve the purpose.

Letting agents observe the aggregate history of past actions or the action of the first agent are effective policies beyond OIP networks. For instance, by an argument similar to the previous one, letting agents observe the action of the first agent reduces inefficient duplication of costly search under random sampling of one agent from the past. Such interventions, however, do not remove the inefficient duplication of costly search arising when agents fail to recognize actions that are inferior, and not revealed to be so, by some time n. In addition, such interventions do not incetivize exploration; thus, agents delay the second search more than the single decision maker and the rate of convergence remains too slow. A natural step for future research is to understand how and to what extent more complex incentive schemes, which make use of monetary transfers or information management tools, can reduce these other inefficiencies as well.[19]

7   Concluding Remarks

I study observational learning over general networks where rational agents acquire private information via costly sequential search. The analysis sheds light on the interplay between social information, the structure of social ties, and individual incentives to acquire and choose private information as an important mechanism for social influence. When search costs are not bounded away from zero, asymptotic learning occurs in well-connected networks in which information paths are identifiable. The result relies on two theoretical underpinnings: first, I relate agents' solution to their information acquisition problem to the probability that they select the best action in equilibrium; second, I establish an IP for a novel informational environment, which significantly departs from that studied by previous models of social learning. The IP, however, is particularly fragile: it breaks down as soon as zero is no longer in the support of the search cost distribution. When search costs are bounded away from zero, even the weaker requirement of maximal learning fails in most common deterministic and stochastic networks. In some special stochastic networks, however, maximal (and sometimes also asymptotic) learning obtains despite search costs that are bounded away from zero. Large-sample and martingale convergence

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[19]A recent and growing literature in economics and computer science, including Smith, Sørensen and Tian (2017), Kremer, Mansour and Perry (2014), Che and Hörner (2018), Papanastasiou, Bimpikis and Savva (2018), Mansour, Slivkins and Syrgkanis (2015), and Mansour, Slivkins, Syrgkanis and Wu (2016), studies optimal design in the SSLM and other related sequential social learning environments.

arguments have almost no room to operate. This prevents societies from learning via the direct observation of large samples of other agents and the aggregation of the information that their choices convey. The rate of convergence, the probability of wrong herds, and long-run efficiency properties are the same irrespective of whether each agent observes all prior choices, only the previous choice, or the choices of random numbers of immediate predecessors. Reducing network transparency, however, leads to short-run welfare and efficiency losses, and the density of indirect connections affects convergence rates.

Several questions remain. First, a general characterization of networks in which maximal learning obtains when search costs are bounded away from zero is missing. Finding the demarcation line between possibility and impossibility of maximal learning in terms of network properties would be a valuable addition to this research. Second, quantifying the speed and efficiency of social learning in more general network topologies is an important, but complex, task. Third, it remains to study the design of more complex incentives schemes to reduce inefficiencies and foster social exploration.

More broadly, relaxing the assumptions that agents have homogeneous preferences or that they can only take an action they have sampled may generate new insights. Lobel and Sadler (2016) study preference heterogeneity and homophily in the SSLM. They find that the IP suffers, as imitation no longer guarantees the same payoff that a neighbor obtains when preferences are diverse; the LSP, instead, has more room to operate. In the setting I study, the IP is the key learning principle, whereas the LSP has much less bite. Therefore, it is unclear what the analysis of preference heterogeneity would look like in collective search environments. Relaxing the assumption that agents can only take an action they have sampled is also non-trivial; this is a difficult question even for the single-agent sequential search problem (see Doval (2018) for recent progress).

Alternatively, one may assume that acquiring private information and observing past histories are both costly activities. If agents are heterogeneous across these two dimensions, in equilibrium some agents will specialize in search, while others in networking, thus enabling information to diffuse. Studying how agents make this trade-off, which network structures endogenously emerge, and the implications for social learning is a promising direction for future research.

Understanding the interplay between social information, the structure of social ties, and search behavior is particularly compelling given individuals' large and growing use of search engines to look for information. In online environments, others' experiences are readily available via online social networks and guide what individuals search, the order in which they do so, and their resulting purchase, adoption, or sharing decisions. An interesting avenue for future research would be to empirically disentangle this channel from other possible explanations for social influence and to asses its impact on social learning outcomes and diffusion patterns.

A   Examples for Section 3.3

The first (resp., second) example shows that the incentive to explore for agents with nonempty neighborhood may increase as the quality of the first action sampled increases (resp., decreases).

Example 5. Suppose the qualities of the two actions are drawn uniformly at random from $\left\{0, \frac{49}{100}, \frac{51}{100}, 1\right\}$. Let $\left\{0, \frac{9}{100}, \frac{1}{8}, \frac{1}{3}\right\}$ be the support of the search cost distribution, with

$$\mathbb{P}_C(c = 0) = \mathbb{P}_C(c = 9/100) = \frac{1}{200}, \quad \mathbb{P}_C(c = 1/8) = \frac{32}{100}, \quad \mathbb{P}_C(c = 1/3) = \frac{67}{100}.$$

Assume without loss that $a_1 = 0$ and that agent 2 observes agent 1's action. By Lemma 13 in Appendix B.3, agent 2 samples first action 0: $s_2^1 = 0$. The expected additional gain form the second search for agent 2 is $P_1(q_0)t^\emptyset(q_0)$, where $P_1(q_0)$ is the posterior probability that action 1 was not sampled by agent 1 given that action 0 of quality q_0 was taken. Here,

$$P_1(q_0) = \frac{N(q_0)}{D(q_0)},$$

with

$$N(q_0) := \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_1 > t^\emptyset(q_0)\right) = \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{P}_C\left(c_1 > t^\emptyset(q_0)\right), \tag{16}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
D(q_0) :=\ & \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_1 > t^\emptyset(q_0)\right) + \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 1, c_1 < t^\emptyset(q_1), q_0 > q_1\right) \\
& + \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_1 \le t^\emptyset(q_0), q_0 > q_1\right) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_1 \le t^\emptyset(q_0), q_0 = q_1\right) \\
=\ & \frac{1}{2}\bigg[\mathbb{P}_C\left(c_1 > t^\emptyset(q_0)\right) + \mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\left(c_1 < t^\emptyset(q_1), q_0 > q_1\right) \\
& + \mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\left(c_1 \le t^\emptyset(q_0), q_0 > q_1\right) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\left(c_1 \le t^\emptyset(q_0), q_0 = q_1\right)\bigg].
\end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

Above, I denoted by $\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}$ the product measure $\mathbb{P}_C \times \mathbb{P}_Q$ and with c_1 agent 1's search cost. To derive an expression for $N(q_0)$ and $P_1(q_0)$ I assumed that agent 1 breaks ties uniformly at random. The tie-breaking rule does not affect the results.[20]

By straightforward calculations:

$$t^\emptyset(0) = \frac{1}{2}, \quad t^\emptyset(49/100) = \frac{51}{400}, \quad t^\emptyset(51/100) = \frac{49}{400}, \quad \text{and} \quad t^\emptyset(1) = 0.$$

Moreover,

$$\mathbb{P}_C\left(c_1 > t^\emptyset(49/100)\right) = \frac{67}{100} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}_C\left(c_1 > t^\emptyset(51/100)\right) = \frac{99}{100},$$

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[20] The same remarks apply to Example 6.

$$\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 < t^\emptyset(q_1), q_1 < 49/100\Big) = \frac{100}{400} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 < t^\emptyset(q_1), q_1 < 51/100\Big) = \frac{133}{400},$$

$$\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 \le t^\emptyset(49/100), 49/100 > q_1\Big) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 \le t^\emptyset(49/100), 49/100 = q_1\Big) = \frac{99}{800},$$

and

$$\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 \le t^\emptyset(51/100), 51/100 > q_1\Big) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 \le t^\emptyset(51/100), 51/100 = q_1\Big) = \frac{5}{800}.$$

Therefore,

$$P_1(49/100) = \frac{536}{800} \quad \text{and} \quad P_1(51/100) = \frac{44}{59}.$$

Note that $t^\emptyset(49/100) > t^\emptyset(51/100)$, whereas $P_1(49/100) < P_1(51/100)$.

To sum up,

$$P_1(49/100)t^\emptyset(49/100) \approx 0.086 < 0.091 \approx P_1(51/100)t^\emptyset(51/100).$$

That is, agent 2's expected additional gain from the second search is smaller when $q_0 = 49/100$ than when $q_0 = 51/100$. Thus, agent 2's incentive to explore increases as the quality of the first action sampled increases. In particular, if agent 2's search cost is 9/100, he samples the second action after sampling an action of quality 51/100, but discontinues search after sampling an action of quality 49/100. ∎

Example 6. Suppose the qualities of the two actions are drawn uniformly at random from $\left\{0, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}, 1\right\}$. Let $\left\{0, \frac{1}{15}, \frac{1}{3}\right\}$ be the support of the search cost distribution, with

$$\mathbb{P}_C(c = 0) = \mathbb{P}_C(c = 1/15) = \frac{1}{4}, \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}_C(c = 1/3) = \frac{1}{2}.$$

As in Example 5, assume $a_1 = 0$, and that agent 2 observes agent 1's action. Thus, agent 2 samples first action 0. Now,

$$t^\emptyset(0) = \frac{1}{2}, \quad t^\emptyset(1/3) = \frac{1}{4}, \quad t^\emptyset(2/3) = \frac{1}{12}, \quad \text{and} \quad t^\emptyset(1) = 0.$$

Moreover,

$$\mathbb{P}_C\Big(c_1 > t^\emptyset(1/3)\Big) = \frac{1}{2} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}_C\Big(c_1 > t^\emptyset(2/3)\Big) = \frac{1}{2},$$

$$\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 < t^\emptyset(q_1), q_1 < 1/3\Big) = \frac{1}{4} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 < t^\emptyset(q_1), q_1 < 2/3\Big) = \frac{3}{8},$$

$$\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 \le t^\emptyset(1/3), 1/3 > q_1\Big) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 \le t^\emptyset(1/3), 1/3 = q_1\Big) = \frac{3}{16},$$

and

$$\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 \le t^\emptyset(2/3), 2/3 > q_1\Big) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{P}_{C\times Q}\Big(c_1 \le t^\emptyset(2/3), 2/3 = q_1\Big) = \frac{5}{16}.$$

Therefore,

$$P_1(1/3) = \frac{8}{15} \quad \text{and} \quad P_1(2/3) = \frac{8}{19},$$

so that now $t^{\emptyset}(1/3) > t^{\emptyset}(2/3)$ and $P_1(1/3) > P_1(2/3)$.

To sum up,
$$P_1(1/3)t^{\emptyset}(1/3) = \frac{2}{15} > \frac{2}{57} = P_1(2/3)t^{\emptyset}(2/3).$$

That is, agent 2's expected additional gain from the second search is larger when $q_0 = 1/3$ than when $q_0 = 2/3$. Thus, agent 2's incentive to explore increases as the quality of the first action sampled decreases. In particular, if agent 2's search cost is $1/15$, he samples the second action after sampling an action of quality $1/3$, but does not after sampling an action of quality $2/3$. ∎

B Proofs

B.1 Proofs for Section 4.2.1

Preliminaries

The first lemma provides an obvious sufficient condition for asymptotic learning.

Lemma 1. *Let a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$ and an equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ be given. If*

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) = 1,$$

then asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium σ.

Proof. In any equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$, each agent takes the action with the highest quality among those he has sampled. Since each agent must sample at least one action, the claim follows. ∎

The next lemma shows that each agent does at least as well as the first agent in terms of the probability of sampling first the action with the highest quality.

Lemma 2. *Let a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$ and an equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ be given. Then,*

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \qquad \forall\, n \in \mathbb{N}.$$

Proof. For $n = 1$, the claim trivially holds. Now fix any $n > 1$ and let b, with $0 \leq b < n$, denote agent n's chosen neighbor. First, suppose $b = 0$. Since $b = 0 \iff B_n = \emptyset$, conditional on $\gamma_n(B(n)) = 0$ agent n faces the same problem as the first agent. Therefore,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \,\middle|\, \gamma_n(B(n)) = 0\right) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right).$$

Since agent 1's decision of which action to sample first is independent of the realization of agent n's neighborhood, the previous equality is equivalent to

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = 0\right) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = 0\right). \quad (18)$$

Second, suppose $0 < b < n$, so that $B_n \neq \emptyset$. By the characterization of the equilibrium decision s_n^1 in Section 3.2.2,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{s_n^1} \mid c_n, B_n, a_k \ \forall\, k \in B_n\right) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{s_1^1} \mid c_n, B_n, a_k \ \forall\, k \in B_n\right)$$

holds true for all realizations of $c_n \in C$, $B_n \in 2^{\mathbb{N}_n} \setminus \{\emptyset\}$, and $a_k \in X$ for all $k \in B_n$. By integrating over all possible private search costs and actions of the agents in the neighborhood, we obtain

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{s_n^1} \mid B_n\right) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{s_1^1} \mid B_n\right)$$

for all $B_n \in 2^{\mathbb{N}_n} \setminus \{\emptyset\}$. Integrating further over all B_n such that $\gamma_n(B_n) = b$ we have

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{s_n^1} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{s_1^1} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right).$$

Thus, conditional on $\gamma_n(B(n)) = b$, the marginal distribution of the quality of action s_n^1 first-order stochastically dominates the marginal distribution of the quality of action s_1^1. Hence,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right). \quad (19)$$

The desired result obtains by observing that

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) = \sum_{b=0}^{n-1} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \mathbb{Q}\left(\gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)$$

$$\geq \sum_{b=0}^{n-1} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \mathbb{Q}\left(\gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)$$

$$= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right),$$

where the two equalities hold by the law of total probability and the inequality holds by (18) and (19). ∎

Proof of Proposition 2

The proof consists of two parts. In the first part, I construct two sequences, $(\alpha_k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $(\phi_k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$, such that for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$, there holds

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \geq \phi_k \qquad \forall\, n \geq \alpha_k. \quad (20)$$

In the second part, I show that $\phi_k \to 1$ as $k \to \infty$. The desired result follows by combining these facts with Lemma 1.

Part 1. By assumptions (a) and (c) of the proposition, for all positive integer α and all $\varepsilon > 0$, there exist a positive integer $N(\alpha, \varepsilon)$ and a sequence of neighbor choice functions $(\gamma_k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ such that

$$\mathbb{Q}\Big(\gamma_n((B(n)) = b, b < \alpha\Big) < \frac{\varepsilon}{2}, \tag{21}$$

and

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n))\right) < \mathcal{Z}\left(\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_{\gamma_n(B(n))}^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)\right) - \varepsilon\right) < \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \tag{22}$$

for all $n \geq N(\alpha, \varepsilon)$. Now, set $\phi_1 := \frac{1}{2}$ and $\alpha_1 := 1$, and define $(\phi_k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $(\alpha_k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ recursively by

$$\phi_{k+1} := \frac{\phi_k + \mathcal{Z}(\phi_k)}{2}, \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha_{k+1} := N(\alpha_k, \varepsilon_k),$$

where the sequence $(\varepsilon_k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ is defined by

$$\varepsilon_k := \frac{1}{2}\left(1 + \mathcal{Z}(\phi_k) - \sqrt{1 + 2\phi_k + \mathcal{Z}(\phi_k)^2}\right).$$

Given the assumptions on $\mathcal{Z}$, these sequences are well-defined. I use induction on the index k to prove relation (20). Since the qualities of the two actions are i.i.d. draws and agent 1 has no a priori information,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) = \frac{1}{2}. \tag{23}$$

From Lemma 2,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \tag{24}$$

for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. From (23) and (24) we have

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \geq \frac{1}{2} \quad \forall n \geq 1,$$

which together with $\alpha_1 = 1$ and $\phi_1 = \frac{1}{2}$ establishes relation (20) for $k = 1$. Assume that relation (20) holds for an arbitrary k, that is

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_j^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \geq \phi_k \quad \forall j \geq \alpha_k, \tag{25}$$

and consider some agent $n \geq \alpha_{k+1}$. To establish (20) for $n \geq \alpha_{k+1}$ observe that

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) = \sum_{b=0}^{n-1} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n((B(n)) = b\right) \mathbb{Q}\left(\gamma_n((B(n)) = b\right)$$

$$\geq (1 - \varepsilon_k)\left(\mathcal{Z}(\phi_k) - \varepsilon_k\right)$$

$$\geq \phi_{k+1},$$

where the inequality follows from (21) and (22), the inductive hypothesis in (25), and the assumption that $\mathcal{Z}$ is increasing.

Part 2. By assumption (b) of the proposition, $\mathcal{Z}(\beta) \geq \beta$ for all $\beta \in [1/2, 1]$; it follows from the definition of ϕ_k that $(\phi_k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a non-decreasing sequence. Since it is also bounded, it converges to some ϕ^*. Taking the limit in the definition of ϕ_k, we obtain

$$2\phi^* = 2 \lim_{k \to \infty} \phi_k = \lim_{k \to \infty} \left[\phi_k + \mathcal{Z}(\phi_k)\right] = \phi^* + \mathcal{Z}(\phi^*),$$

where the third equality holds by continuity of $\mathcal{Z}$. This shows that $\phi^* = \mathcal{Z}(\phi^*)$, i.e. ϕ^* is a fixed point of $\mathcal{Z}$. Since the unique fixed point of $\mathcal{Z}$ is 1, we have $\phi_k \to 1$ as $k \to \infty$, as claimed. ∎

Proof of Proposition 3

Proposition 3 follows by combining several lemmas, which I next present.

Hereafter, let a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$, a state of the world $\omega := (q_0, q_1) \in \Omega$, an equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_\mathcal{S}$, a sequence of neighbor choice functions $(\gamma_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$, and an agent $n \in \mathbb{N}$ be fixed. Moreover, let b, with $0 \leq b < n$, be agent n's chosen neighbor.

Let $\tilde{s}_n^1$ be agent n's coarse optimal decision at the first search stage when he only uses information from neighbor b.[21] The optimal search policy, as characterized in Section 3.2.2, requires

$$\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\min_{x \in X} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, a_b\right),$$

where indifference is resolved according to agent n's mixed strategy.

Suppose the probability that none of the agents in $\hat{B}(n, a_b)$ sampled both actions is smaller than the probability that none of the agents in $\hat{B}(n, \neg a_b)$ sampled both actions whenever agent n's neighbor choice function selects agent b, with $0 \leq b < n$. That is,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right). \tag{26}$$

Then, agent n samples first action a_b: $\tilde{s}_n^1 = a_b$. Hereafter, assume that agent n samples first action a_b in case of indifference. The assumption does not affect the results. The next lemma summarizes.

---

[21] By definition of neighbor choice function, the fictitious agent 0 is agent n's chosen neighbor iff $B_n = \emptyset$.

Lemma 3. *Suppose* $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b)$ *and* $\gamma_n(B(n)) = b$. *Then, the coarse version* $\tilde{s}_n^1$ *of agent* n*'s equilibrium strategy at the first search stage is* $\tilde{s}_n^1 = a_b$.

Remark 4. Since $\gamma_n(B(n)) = 0$ iff $B(n) = \emptyset$, it is without loss of generality to impose $\tilde{s}_n^1 = s_n^1$ conditional on $\gamma_n(B(n)) = 0$. That is, conditional on $\gamma_n(B(n)) = 0$, the coarse version of agent n's equilibrium decision of which action to sample first coincides with his equilibrium decision.

The next lemma shows that network topologies where $\mathbb{Q}(|B(n)| \leq 1) = 1$ for all n satisfy condition (26). In particular, this condition is satisfied by all chosen neighbor topologies.

Lemma 4. *Suppose that the network topology* $(\mathbb{B}, \mathcal{F}_\mathbb{B}, \mathbb{Q})$ *satisfies* $\mathbb{Q}(|B(n)| \leq 1) = 1$ *for all* $n \in \mathbb{N}$. *Then,* $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \hat{B}(n) = \hat{B}_n) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \hat{B}(n) = \hat{B}_n)$ *for all agents* n *and* b, *with* $0 \leq b < n$, *and for all realizations* $\hat{B}_n$ *that occurs with positive probability. It follows that* $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b)$ *for all* n *and* b, *with* $0 \leq b < n$.

Proof. Proceed by induction. The first agent has empty neighborhood. Hence, his personal subnetworks relative to the two actions are empty and the statement is vacuously true.

Now suppose $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \hat{B}(n) = \hat{B}_n) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \hat{B}(n) = \hat{B}_n)$ for all $n \leq k$ and all $\hat{B}_n$ that occurs with positive probability. Given a realization $\hat{B}_{k+1}$ of $\hat{B}(k+1)$, if $B_{k+1} = \emptyset$, then agent $k+1$ faces the same situation as the first agent, and the desired conclusion follows. If $B_{k+1} = \{b\}$, take $\gamma_{k+1}(\{b\}) = b$ and let $(\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_l)$ be the sequence of agents in $\hat{B}_{k+1} \cup \{k+1\}$. That is, $\{\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_l\}$ is such that $\pi_1 = \min \hat{B}_{k+1}$, $\pi_l = k+1$ and, for all g with $1 < g \leq l$, $B_{\pi_g} = \{\pi_{g-1}\}$. Moreover, for all g with $1 < g \leq l$, say that agent π_{g-1} is the immediate predecessor of agent π_g in $\hat{B}_{k+1}$. When $\hat{B}_{k+1} = \{b\}$, the desired result trivially holds. When $\hat{B}_{k+1}$ contains more than one agent, the desired result follows by observing that, under the inductive hypothesis and the equilibrium decision rule, each agent in $\{\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_{l-1}\}$ samples first the action taken by his immediate predecessor. $\blacksquare$

Definition 11. *Fix a state of the world* $\omega := (q_0, q_1) \in \Omega$ *and an equilibrium* $\sigma \in \Sigma_\mathcal{S}$. *The following objects are defined:*

$$q_{\min} := \min \{q_0, q_1\},$$

$$q_{\max} := \max \{q_0, q_1\},$$

$$P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min}) := \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_b^{s_b^1} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, q_{s_b^1} = q_{\min} \right)$$

$$= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_b^{s_b^1} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^1 \notin \underset{x \in X}{\arg\max}\ q_x \right),$$

$$P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max}) := \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_b^{s_b^1} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, q_{s_b^1} = q_{\max} \right)$$

$$= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_b^{s_b^1} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^1 \in \underset{x \in X}{\arg\max}\ q_x \right),$$

$$\beta := \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \underset{x \in X}{\arg\max}\ q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b \right).$$

Remark 5. In any $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$, $\beta \geq \frac{1}{2}$ for all $b \in \mathbb{N}$. This is so because the distribution of the quality of the first action sampled by an agent first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of the quality of the other action.

The next two lemmas provide an expression for the probability of agent n sampling first the best action when using $\tilde{s}_n^1$, conditional on agent b being selected by agent n's neighbor choice function, in terms of the probability β of agent b doing so, the private search cost distribution, the function $t^\emptyset(\cdot)$ defined in (2), and the thresholds $P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})$ and $P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})$.

Lemma 5. *Suppose* $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b)$. *Then,*

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)
$$

$$
= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \tag{27}
$$

$$
+ \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)\left(1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)\right).
$$

Proof. By Lemma 3,

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(a_b \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right).
$$

Moreover,

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(a_b \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)
$$

$$
= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(a_b \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1\right)\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)
$$

$$
+ \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(a_b \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^2 = ns\right)\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = ns \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)
$$

$$
= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)
$$

$$
+ \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)\left(1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)\right)
$$

$$
= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)
$$

$$
+ \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)\left(1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)\right).
$$

Here: the first equality holds by the law of total probability; the second equality holds because whenever agent b samples both actions, $s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1$, he takes the one with the highest quality, so that $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(a_b \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1) = 1$, and when agent b only samples one action, $s_b^2 = ns$, he takes that action, so that $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(a_b \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^2 = ns) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b)$. The desired result

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follows.∎

Lemma 6. *Suppose* $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b)$. *Then,*

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)$$
$$= \beta + (1-\beta)\left[\beta F_C\Big(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\Big) + (1-\beta)F_C\Big(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})t^\emptyset(q_{\min})\Big)\right].$$

Proof. By Lemma 5,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) = \beta + \mathbb{P}_\sigma\Big(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\Big)(1-\beta). \quad (28)$$

Moreover, by the law of total probability,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\Big(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\Big)$$
$$= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)$$
$$+ \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^1 \notin \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \notin \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)$$
$$\tag{29}$$
$$= \beta\, \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)$$
$$+ (1-\beta)\, \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^1 \notin \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right).$$

By the characterization of equilibrium strategies in Section 3.2.2 we have, conditional on $\gamma_n(B(n)) = b$ and $s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x$,

$$s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \iff c_b \leq P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})t^\emptyset(q_{\max}),$$

and, conditional on $\gamma_n(B(n)) = b$ and $s_b^1 \notin \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x$,

$$s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \iff c_b \leq P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})t^\emptyset(q_{\min}).$$

It follows that

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) = F_C\Big(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\Big),$$

and that

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^1 \notin \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) = F_C\Big(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})t^\emptyset(q_{\min})\Big).$$

Thus, equation (29) can be rewritten as

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^2 = \neg s_b^1 \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) = \beta F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right)$$
$$+ (1-\beta)F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})t^\emptyset(q_{\min})\right). \tag{30}$$

The desired result follows by combining (28) and (30). ∎

The previous lemma shows that the quantity

$$(1-\beta)\left[\beta F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right) + (1-\beta)F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})t^\emptyset(q_{\min})\right)\right]$$

acts as an improvement in the probability that agent n samples first the best action over his chosen neighbor's probability. This improvement term is still unsuitable for the analysis to come because it depends on $P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})$ and $P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})$, which are difficult to handle. The next lemma provides a simple lower bound on the amount of this improvement. It also establishes that this lower bound is uniformly bounded away from zero whenever $\beta < 1$, and that it is non-negative when $\beta = 1$.

Lemma 7. *Suppose* $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b) \le \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b)$. *Then,*

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \ge \beta + (1-\beta)^2 F_C\left((1-\beta)t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right).$$

Proof. Whenever at least one of the agents in the personal subnetwork of agent b relative to action s_b^1 samples both actions, $s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x$. Thus, $\beta \ge 1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_b^{s_b^1} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)$, or

$$1 - \beta \le \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_b^{s_b^1} \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right). \tag{31}$$

Moreover, by the law of total probability,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_b^{s_b^1} \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)$$
$$= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_b^{s_b^1} \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)$$
$$+ \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_b^{s_b^1} \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b, s_b^1 \notin \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \notin \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\Big|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \tag{32}$$
$$= \beta P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max}) + (1-\beta)P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min}).$$

Combining (31) and (32) yields

$$1 - \beta \le \beta P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max}) + (1-\beta)P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min}), \tag{33}$$

and therefore

$$\max\left\{P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min}), P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})\right\} \ge 1 - \beta. \tag{34}$$

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Finally, observe that

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \ \Big| \ \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)
$$

$$
= \beta + (1-\beta)\left[\beta F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right) + (1-\beta)F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})t^\emptyset(q_{\min})\right)\right]
$$

$$
\geq \beta + (1-\beta)\left[(1-\beta)F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right) + (1-\beta)F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})t^\emptyset(q_{\min})\right)\right]
$$

$$
= \beta + (1-\beta)^2\left[F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right) + F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})t^\emptyset(q_{\min})\right)\right]
$$

$$
\geq \beta + (1-\beta)^2\left[F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right) + F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right)\right]
$$

$$
\geq \beta + (1-\beta)^2 \max\left\{F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right), F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right)\right\}
$$

$$
\geq \beta + (1-\beta)^2 F_C\left((1-\beta)t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right).
$$

Here, the first equality holds by Lemma 6; the first inequality holds because, as $\beta \geq 1/2$ by Remark 5, $\beta \geq (1-\beta)$; the second inequality holds because $t^\emptyset(q_{\max}) \leq t^\emptyset(q_{\min})$ and the CDF F_C is increasing; the third inequality holds because F_C is non-negative; the last inequality follows from

$$
\max\left\{F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\max})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right), F_C\left(P_{b,n}^\sigma(q_{\min})t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right)\right\} \geq F_C\left((1-\beta)t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right),
$$

which holds because of (34) and the fact that F_C is increasing. The desired result follows.∎

The previous lemmas describe the improvement a single agent can make over his neighbor by employing a heuristic that discards the information from all other neighbors. To study the limiting behavior of these improvements, I introduce the function $\overline{\mathcal{Z}} \colon [1/2, 1] \to [1/2, 1]$ defined pointwise by

$$
\overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\beta) := \beta + (1-\beta)^2 F_C\left((1-\beta)t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right). \tag{35}
$$

Hereafter, I call $(1-\beta)^2 F_C((1-\beta)t^\emptyset(q_{\max}))$ the *improvement term* of function $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}$. Lemma 7 establishes that, when $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b)$, we have

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \ \Big| \ \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) = \overline{\mathcal{Z}}\left(\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \ \Big| \ \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)\right).
$$

That is, the function $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}$ acts as an *improvement function* for the evolution of the probability of searching first for the best action. The next lemma presents some useful properties of $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}$.

Lemma 8. *The function $\overline{\mathcal{Z}} \colon [1/2, 1] \to [1/2, 1]$, defined by (35), satisfies the following properties:*

(a) For all $\beta \in [1/2, 1]$, $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\beta) \geq \beta$.

(b) If the search technology features search costs that are not bounded away from zero, then $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\beta) > \beta$ for all $\beta \in [1/2, 1)$.

(c) The function $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}$ is left-continuous and has no upward jumps: $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\beta) = \lim_{r\uparrow\beta} \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(r) \geq \lim_{r\downarrow\beta} \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(r)$.

Proof. Since F_C is a CDF and $(1-\beta)^2 \geq 0$, the improvement term of function $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}$ is always non-negative. Part (a) follows.

For all $\beta \in [1/2, 1)$, $(1-\beta)t^\emptyset(q_{\max}) > 0$ and so, if search costs are not bounded away from zero, $F_C((1-\beta)t^\emptyset(q_{\max})) > 0$.[22] Since also $(1-\beta)^2 > 0$ for all $\beta \in [1/2, 1)$, the improvement term of function $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}$ is positive and so part (b) holds.

For part (c), set $\alpha := (1-\beta)t^\emptyset(q_{\max})$. Since F_C is a CDF, it is right-continuous and has no downward jumps in α. Therefore, F_C is left-continuous and has no upward jumps in β. Since β and $(1-\beta)^2$ are continuous functions of β, and so also left-continuous with no upward jumps, the desired result follows because the product and the sum of left-continuous functions with no upward jumps is left-continuous with no upward jumps.∎

Next, I construct a related function $\mathcal{Z}$ that is monotone and continuous while maintaining the same improvement properties of $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}$. In particular, define $\mathcal{Z}: [1/2, 1] \to [1/2, 1]$ as

$$\mathcal{Z}(\beta) := \frac{1}{2}\left(\beta + \sup_{r\in[1/2,\beta]} \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(r)\right). \tag{36}$$

Lemma 9. *The function $\mathcal{Z}: [1/2, 1] \to [1/2, 1]$ defined by (36) satisfies the following properties:*

(a) For all $\beta \in [1/2, 1]$, $\mathcal{Z}(\beta) \geq \beta$.

(b) If the search technology features search costs that are not bounded away from zero, then $\mathcal{Z}(\beta) > \beta$ for all $\beta \in [1/2, 1)$.

(c) The function $\mathcal{Z}$ is increasing and continuous.

Proof. Parts (a) and (b) immediately result from the corresponding parts of Lemma 8.

The function $\sup_{r\in[1/2,\beta]} \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(r)$ is non-decreasing and the function β is increasing. Thus, the average of these two functions, which is $\mathcal{Z}$, is an increasing function, establishing the first part of (c). Finally, I show that $\mathcal{Z}$ is continuous. To establish continuity in $[1/2, 1)$, I argue by contradiction. Suppose that $\mathcal{Z}$ is discontinuous at some $\beta' \in [1/2, 1)$. This implies that $\sup_{r\in[1/2,\beta]} \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(r)$ is discontinuous at β'. Since $\sup_{r\in[1/2,\beta]} \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(r)$ is a non-decreasing function, it must be that

$$\lim_{\beta\downarrow\beta'} \sup_{r\in[1/2,\beta]} \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(r) > \sup_{r\in[1/2,\beta']} \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(r),$$

from which it follows that there exists some $\varepsilon > 0$ such that for all $\delta > 0$

$$\sup_{r\in[1/2,\beta'+\delta]} \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(r) > \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\beta) + \varepsilon \quad \forall \beta \in [1/2, \beta').$$

---

[22]Note that $t^\emptyset(q_{\max}) = 0$ if $q_{s_b^1} = q_{\max} = \max \operatorname{supp}(\mathbb{P}_Q)$ whenever such sup exists as a real number. However, in such cases we would trivially have $\beta = 1$, which is not the case considered here.

This contradicts that the function $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}$ has no upward jumps, which was established as property (c) in Lemma 8. Continuity of $\mathcal{Z}$ at $\beta = 1$ follows from part (a). ∎

The next lemma shows that the function $\mathcal{Z}$ is also a *improvement function* for the evolution of the probability of searching first for the action with highest quality.

Lemma 10. *Suppose that* $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b)$. *Then,*

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\middle|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \geq \mathcal{Z}\left(\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\middle|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right)\right).$$

Proof. If $\mathcal{Z}(\beta) = \beta$, the result follows from Lemma 6. Suppose next that $\mathcal{Z}(\beta) > \beta$. By (36), this implies that $\mathcal{Z}(\beta) < \sup_{r \in [1/2, \beta]} \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(r)$. Thus, there exists $\overline{\beta} \in [1/2, \beta]$ such that

$$\overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\overline{\beta}) \geq \mathcal{Z}(\beta). \tag{37}$$

I next show that $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b) \geq \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\overline{\beta})$. Agent n can always make his decision even coarser by choosing not to observe agent b's choice with some probability. Suppose that instead of considering b's action directly, agent n bases his decision of which action to sample first on the observation of a fictitious agent whose action, denoted by $\tilde{a}_b$, is generated as

$$\tilde{a}_b = \begin{cases} a_b & \text{with probability} \;\; (2\overline{\beta} - 1)/(2\beta - 1) \\ 0 & \text{with probability} \;\; (\beta - \overline{\beta})/(2\beta - 1) \\ 1 & \text{with probability} \;\; (\beta - \overline{\beta})/(2\beta - 1), \end{cases} \tag{38}$$

with the realization of $\tilde{a}_b$ independent of the rest of n's information set. Under the assumption $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b)$, we have

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{\tilde{a}_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{\neg \tilde{a}_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right). \tag{39}$$

The relation in (39), together with the characterization of the equilibrium search policy in Section 3.2.2, implies that agent n samples first action $\tilde{a}_b$ upon observing the choice of the fictitious agent. That is, denoting with $\widetilde{s_n^1}$ the first action sampled by agent n upon observing the choice of the fictitious agent, $\widetilde{s_n^1} = \tilde{a}_b$. Moreover, the assumption $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\neg a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b)$ and (38) also imply that $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{a_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(E_n^{\tilde{a}_b} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b)$. Therefore, the distribution of the quality of action a_b first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of the quality of action $\tilde{a}_b$. Since $\tilde{s}_n^1 = a_b$ and $\widetilde{s_n^1} = \tilde{a}_b$, it follows that

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\middle|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\widetilde{s_n^1} \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \;\middle|\; \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right). \tag{40}$$

Now denote with $\tilde{s}_b^1$ the decision of the fictitious agent about which action to sample

first. From (38), one can think of $\tilde{s}_b^1$ as generated as

$$
\tilde{s}_b^1 = \begin{cases} s_b^1 & \text{with probability } (2\overline{\beta}-1)/(2\beta-1) \\ 0 & \text{with probability } (\beta-\overline{\beta})/(2\beta-1) \\ 1 & \text{with probability } (\beta-\overline{\beta})/(2\beta-1). \end{cases}
$$

Therefore,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x\in X} q_x \,\middle|\, \gamma_n(B(n))=b\right) &= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_b^1 \in \arg\max_{x\in X} q_x \,\middle|\, \gamma_n(B(n))=b\right)\frac{2\overline{\beta}-1}{2\beta-1} \\
&\quad + \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(0 \in \arg\max_{x\in X} q_x \,\middle|\, \gamma_n(B(n))=b\right)\frac{\beta-\overline{\beta}}{2\beta-1} \\
&\quad + \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(1 \in \arg\max_{x\in X} q_x \,\middle|\, \gamma_n(B(n))=b\right)\frac{\beta-\overline{\beta}}{2\beta-1} \\
&= \beta\frac{2\overline{\beta}-1}{2\beta-1} + (\beta+(1-\beta))\frac{\beta-\overline{\beta}}{2\beta-1} \\
&= \overline{\beta}.
\end{aligned}
$$

Lemma 7 implies that the first action sampled by agent n based on the observation of this fictitious agent is the one with the highest quality with probability at least $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\overline{\beta})$, that is

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\widetilde{\tilde{s}_n^1} \in \arg\max_{x\in X} q_x \,\middle|\, \gamma_n(B(n))=b\right) \geq \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\overline{\beta}). \tag{41}
$$

Since $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\overline{\beta}) \geq \mathcal{Z}(\beta)$ (see equation (37)), the desired result follows from (40) and (41). ∎

It remains to show that the equilibrium search policy s_n^1 does at least as well as its coarse version $\tilde{s}_n^1$ given $\gamma_n(B(n)) = b$. This is established with the next lemma and completes the proof of Proposition 3.

Lemma 11. *For all agents n and any b, with $0 \leq b < n$, we have*

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x\in X} q_x \,\middle|\, \gamma_n(B(n))=b\right) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x\in X} q_x \,\middle|\, \gamma_n(B(n))=b\right).
$$

Proof. Fix any $n \in \mathbb{N}$. If $b = 0$, then $\tilde{s}_n^1 = s_n^1$ by Remark 4, and the claim trivially holds. Now suppose $0 < b < n$, so that $B_n \neq \emptyset$. By the characterization of the equilibrium decision s_n^1 in Section 3.2.2,

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{s_n^1} \,\middle|\, c_n, B_n, a_k \,\forall\, k \in B_n\right) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{\tilde{s}_n^1} \,\middle|\, c_n, B_n, a_k \,\forall\, k \in B_n\right)
$$

holds true for all realizations of $c_n \in C$, $B_n \in 2^{\mathbb{N}_n} \setminus \{\emptyset\}$, and $a_k \in X$ for all $k \in B_n$. By integrating over all possible private search costs and actions of the agents in the

neighborhood, we obtain

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{s_n^1} \mid B_n\right) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{\tilde{s}_n^1} \mid B_n\right) \tag{42}$$

for all $B_n \in 2^{\mathbb{N}_n} \setminus \{\emptyset\}$. Integrating further over all B_n such that $\gamma_n(B_n) = b$ we conclude

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{s_n^1} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(E_n^{\tilde{s}_n^1} \mid \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right).$$

Then, conditional on $\gamma_n(B(n)) = b$, the marginal distribution of the quality of action s_n^1 first-order stochastically dominates the marginal distribution of the quality of action $\tilde{s}_n^1$. Therefore,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \,\Big|\, \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\tilde{s}_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \,\Big|\, \gamma_n(B(n)) = b\right),$$

as desired. ∎

B.2   Proofs for Section 4.3

Preliminaries

Definition 12. *Let q^{NS}, Q^{NS}, and Ω^{NS} be defined as follows:*
- $q^{NS} := \inf\{\tilde{q} \in \text{supp}(\mathbb{P}_Q) : 1\text{–}(a) \text{ and } 1\text{–}(b) \text{ in Assumption 1 hold}\}$;
- $Q^{NS} := \{\tilde{q} \in Q : \tilde{q} \geq q^{NS}\}$;
- $\Omega^{NS} := Q^{NS} \times Q^{NS}$.

In words, Ω^{NS} consists of all states of the world ω in which, with positive probability, an agent with empty neighborhood does not sample the second action independently of which action he samples first. By the first condition in Assumption 1, there exists some $\delta > 0$ such that $\mathbb{P}_Q(Q^{NS}) \geq \sqrt{\delta}$ and so, by definition of product measure,

$$\mathbb{P}_\Omega\left(\Omega^{NS}\right) = \mathbb{P}_Q\left(Q^{NS}\right) \times \mathbb{P}_Q\left(Q^{NS}\right) \geq \delta. \tag{43}$$

If $\omega \in \Omega^{NS}$, an agent with nonempty neighborhood does not sample the second action either with positive probability, independently of which action he samples first (see the characterization of equilibrium search policies in Section 3.2). Finally, by Assumption 1, conditional on $\omega \in \Omega^{NS}$, the two actions have different quality with positive probability.

Fix a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$. Asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_\mathcal{S}$ only if the probability of agent n taking the action with the lowest quality converges to zero with respect to $\mathbb{P}_\sigma$ as n goes to infinity. Because of Assumption 1, a necessary condition for this to happen is that the probability of no agent in $\hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}$ sampling both actions converges to zero as n goes to infinity with respect to $\mathbb{P}_\sigma$. If this

were not the case, there would be a subsequence of agents who, with probability bounded away from zero, only observe (directly or indirectly) agents who have not compared the quality of the two actions (as none of the agents in their personal subnetworks has sampled both actions), and do not make this comparison either (as they do not search for the second alternative). Asymptotic learning would trivially fail as the only way to ascertain the relative quality of the two actions is to sample both of them. The next lemma follows.

Lemma 12. *Let a collective search environment $\mathcal{S}$ and an equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ be given. If asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium σ, then*

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}\right) = 0.$$

Proof of Proposition 4

Let $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ be arbitrary. In view of Lemma 12, to prove Theorem 4 it is enough to show that

$$\limsup_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}\right) > 0.$$

Since the network topology has non-expanding subnetworks, there exist some positive integer K, some real number $\varepsilon > 0$, and a subsequence of agents $\mathcal{N}$ such that

$$\mathbb{Q}\left(\left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K\right) \geq \varepsilon \qquad \forall \, n \in \mathcal{N}. \tag{44}$$

For all $n \in \mathcal{N}$, by the law of total probability we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}\right) \\
&= \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \Big| \ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K\right)\mathbb{Q}\left(\left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K\right) \\
&\quad + \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \Big| \ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| \geq K\right)\mathbb{Q}\left(\left|\hat{B}(n)\right| \geq K\right) \\
&\geq \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \Big| \ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K\right)\mathbb{Q}\left(\left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K\right) \\
&\geq \varepsilon \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \Big| \ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K\right),
\end{aligned}
\tag{45}
$$

where the last inequality follows from (44). By the law of total probability again, we also have

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \Big| \ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K\right) \\
&= \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \Big| \ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K, \omega \in \Omega^{NS}\right)\mathbb{P}_{\Omega}\left(\omega \in \Omega^{NS}\right) \\
&\quad + \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \Big| \ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K, \omega \notin \Omega^{NS}\right)\mathbb{P}_{\Omega}\left(\omega \notin \Omega^{NS}\right) \\
&\geq \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \Big| \ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K, \omega \in \Omega^{NS}\right)\mathbb{P}_{\Omega}\left(\omega \in \Omega^{NS}\right) \\
&\geq \delta \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \Big| \ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K, \omega \in \Omega^{NS}\right),
\end{aligned}
\tag{46}
$$

where the last inequality holds by (43). Then, by (45) and (46), for all agents $n \in \mathcal{N}$ we

have

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}\right) \\
&\geq \varepsilon\delta\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \middle|\ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K, \omega \in \Omega^{NS}\right).
\end{aligned}
\tag{47}
$$

Let $\overline{C}_\sigma(q^{NS})$ denote the set of all search costs for which, in equilibrium σ, an agent with empty neighborhood decides not to sample the second action when the first action he samples has quality q^{NS}. For all $\omega \in \Omega^{NS}$, by the results in Section 3.2, any agent k with search cost $c_k \in \overline{C}_\sigma(q^{NS})$ adopts strategy $s_k^2 = ns$ at the second search stage independently of his neighborhood realization B_k, the actions of his neighbors, and the quality of the first action sampled. Then,

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \middle|\ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K, \omega \in \Omega^{NS}\right) \\
&\geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(c_k \in \overline{C}_\sigma(q^{NS}) \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \middle|\ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K, \omega \in \Omega^{NS}\right).
\end{aligned}
\tag{48}
$$

Moreover, as individual search costs are independent of the network topology and the realized quality of the two actions,

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(c_k \in \overline{C}_\sigma(q^{NS}) \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \middle|\ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K, \omega \in \Omega^{NS}\right) \\
&= \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(c_k \in \overline{C}_\sigma(q^{NS}) \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \middle|\ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K\right).
\end{aligned}
\tag{49}
$$

Finally, as $\left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K \iff \left|\hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}\right| \leq K$ and individual search costs are independent of the network topology and i.i.d. across agents, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(c_k \in \overline{C}_\sigma(q^{NS}) \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \middle|\ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K\right) \\
&\geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(c_1 \in \overline{C}_\sigma(q^{NS})\right)^K \\
&> 0,
\end{aligned}
\tag{50}
$$

where the strict inequality holds because $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(c_1 \in \overline{C}_\sigma(q^{NS})) > 0$ by the first condition in Assumption 1. Together, (48), (49), and (50) yield that

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\} \ \middle|\ \left|\hat{B}(n)\right| < K, \omega \in \Omega^{NS}\right) > 0.
\tag{51}
$$

As $\varepsilon, \delta > 0$, from (47) and (51) we conclude that

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}\right) > 0
$$

for all agents n in the subsequence $\mathcal{N}$, which implies

$$
\limsup_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_k^2 = ns \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}\right) > 0,
$$

as desired. ∎

B.3 Preliminaries for Sections 5 and 6

Characterization of Equilibrium Strategies in OIP Networks

Part (a) of Theorem 2 and the results in Section 6 are largely based on the next lemma, which characterizes equilibrium sequential search policies in OIP networks. Let $P_1(q)$ denote the posterior probability that agent 1 did not sample the second action given that the action he takes has quality q. The precise functional form of $P_1(q)$ is irrelevant for the following argument.

Lemma 13. *Let $\mathcal{S}$ be a collective search environment in which the network topology features observation of immediate predecessors. Then, in any equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$:*

(i) At the first search stage, each agent $n \in \mathbb{N}$, with $n \geq 2$, samples first the action taken by his immediate predecessor. That is, $s_n^1 = a_{n-1}$.

(ii) At the second search stage, each agent n, with $n \geq 2$:

  (a) Does not sample action $\neg a_{n-1}$ (i.e. $s_n^2 = ns$) if $\neg a_{n-1}$ is revealed to be inferior to agent n in equilibrium σ.

  (b) Samples action $\neg a_{n-1}$ (i.e. $s_n^2 = \neg a_{n-1}$) if $\neg a_{n-1}$ is not revealed inferior to agent n in equilibrium σ, and agent n's search cost c_n is smaller than $t_n(q_{s_n^1})$, where the function $t_n \colon Q \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is defined pointwise by

$$t_n\big(q_{s_n^1}\big) := P_1\big(q_{s_n^1}\big)t^\emptyset\big(q_{s_n^1}\big) \tag{52}$$

for $n = 2$, and pointwise recursively as

$$t_n\big(q_{s_n^1}\big) := P_1\big(q_{s_n^1}\big)\bigg(\prod_{i=2}^{n-1}\big(1 - F_C\big(t_i\big(q_{s_n^1}\big)\big)\big)\bigg)t^\emptyset\big(q_{s_n^1}\big) \tag{53}$$

for $n > 2$.

Proof. To prove part (i), proceed by induction. Consider agent 2 and his conditional belief over Ω given that the first agent has taken action a_1. For action $\neg a_1$, two mutually exclusive cases are possible:

1. Agent 1 sampled $\neg a_1$. In this case, $q_{\neg a_1} \leq q_{a_1}$, as agent 1 picked the best alternative at the choice stage. If agent 2 knew this to be the case, his conditional belief on Ω would be $\mathbb{P}_{\Omega|q_{a_1} \geq q_{\neg a_1}}$.

2. Agent 1 did not sample $\neg a_1$. If agent 2 knew this to be the case, his posterior belief on action $\neg a_1$ would be the same as the prior $\mathbb{P}_Q$.

Then, regardless of the beliefs of agent 2 about agent 1's search decisions, agent 2's belief about the quality of action $\neg a_1$ is strictly first-order stochastically dominated by his

beliefs about the quality of action a_1. To see this, note that agent 2 believes that agent 1 has sampled action $\neg a_1$ with positive probability: even if agent 1 sampled a_1 first, by the second condition of Assumption 1, with positive probability, his search costs are low enough that he searched further. Therefore, $s_2^1 = a_1$ is agent 2's optimal policy at the first search stage.

Now consider any agent $n > 2$. Suppose that all agents up to $n-1$ follow this strategy, and that agent $n-1$ selects action a_{n-1}. If action $\neg a_{n-1}$ is revealed inferior to agent n in equilibrium σ, it must be that $q_{\neg a_{n-1}} \leq q_{a_{n-1}}$, and so action $\neg a_{n-1}$ is not sampled at all. Now suppose that action $\neg a_{n-1}$ is not revealed inferior to agent n in equilibrium σ. By the same logic as before, n's beliefs about the quality of action a_{n-1} strictly first-order stochastically dominate his beliefs about the quality of action $\neg a_{n-1}$. Therefore, $s_n^1 = a_{n-1}$, i.e. he will sample action a_{n-1} first.

To establish part *(ii)–(a)*, consider any agent $n \geq 2$, and suppose that $\neg a_{n-1}$ is revealed inferior to agent n in equilibrium σ. Then, there exist $j, j+1 \in B(n)$ such that $a_j = \neg a_{n-1}$ and $a_{j+1} = a_{n-1}$. By part (i) we know that $s_{j+1}^1 = \neg a_{n-1}$. Since agents can only take an action they sampled, it follows that $s_{j+1}^2 = a_{n-1}$, that is, agent $j+1$ has sampled both actions. Then, as agents take the best action whenever they sample both of them, we have $q_{a_{n-1}} \geq q_{\neg a_{n-1}}$, and so the expected additional gain of sampling action $\neg a_{n-1}$ is zero. That $s_n^2 = ns$ is optimal follows.

For part *(ii)–(b)*, consider any agent $n \geq 2$ and suppose that $\neg a_{n-1}$ is not revealed inferior to agent n in equilibrium σ. In OIP networks, the personal subnetwork of agent n, $\hat{B}(n)$, is $\{1, \dots, n-1\}$ with probability one. Moreover, by part (i), each agent samples first the action taken by his immediate predecessor. Therefore, none of the agents in the personal subnetwork of agent n relative to action s_n^1 has sampled action $\neg s_n^1$ only if none of the first $n-1$ agents has sampled it; that is, only if $s_1^1 = s_n^1$, and $s_i^2 = ns$ for $1 \leq i \leq n-1$. The thresholds in (52) and (53) provide an explicit formula for (9) when $\hat{B}(n) = \{1, \dots, n-1\}$ with probability one for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. To see this, proceed by induction. Consider first agent 2. By part (i), $s_2^1 = a_1$. Let $P_1(q_{s_2^1})$ be the posterior probability that agent 1 did not sample action $\neg s_2^1$ given that action s_2^1 of quality $q_{s_2^1}$ was taken. Then, agent 2's expected benefit from the second search is $P_1(q_{s_2^1}) t^\emptyset(q_{s_2^1})$, which is the right-hand side of (52). Now consider any agent $n > 2$, and let s_n^1 be the action this agent samples first. By part (i) and the inductive hypothesis, and since search costs are i.i.d. across agents, it follows that the probability that no agent in $\{1, \dots, n-1\}$ has sampled action $\neg s_n^1$ is

$$
P_1\big(q_{s_n^1}\big) \left(\prod_{i=2}^{n-1} \Big(1 - F_C\big(t_i\big(q_{s_n^1}\big)\big) \Big) \right).
$$

Hence, the right-hand side of (53) gives agent n's expected benefit from the search follows. The optimality of the proposed sequential search policy follows from the characterization of individual equilibrium decisions at the second search stage in Section 3.2.2. ∎

Fix a state process and a search technology. Lemma 13 implies that, from the viewpoint of the probability of selecting the best action, the individual search behavior is equivalent across all OIP networks. In particular, we have the following.

Corollary 1. *Let $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{S}'$ be two collective search environments with identical state process and search technology. Assume that $\mathcal{S}$ is endowed with the complete network, while the network topology of $\mathcal{S}'$ is any OIP network. Finally, let $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ and $\sigma' \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}'}$, and assume that ties are broken according to the same criterion in σ and σ'. Then, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$,*

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(a_n \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \right) = \mathbb{P}_{\sigma'}\left(a_n \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \right).$$

Proof. In OIP networks, each agent samples first the action taken by his immediate predecessor (cf. Lemma 13), and so asymptotic learning trivially occurs when agent 1 takes the best action. Moreover, $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(a_1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x) = \mathbb{P}_{\sigma'}(a_1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x)$. Thus, to establish the result, it suffices to show that $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(a_n \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x) = \mathbb{P}_{\sigma'}(a_n \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x)$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, with $n > 2$, whenever agent 1 does not sample the best action at the first search. In turn, this follows immediately from Lemma 13, which shows that, for all n, the probability that none of the first n agents has sampled both actions is the same across all OIP networks for any fixed quality of the action taken by agent 1. ∎

B.4   Proofs for Section 5.4

Proof of Theorem 2

Proof of part (a). Suppose $\omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$ and $\underline{c} > 0$. Maximal learning requires that the probability that agent n takes the best action converges to one as $n \to \infty$ (see the characterization of maximal learning in (12)). In turn, this is equivalent to saying that the probability of no agent in $\hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}$ sampling both actions converges to zero as $n \to \infty$ whenever the quality of the first action sampled by agent 1 is lower than $q(\underline{c})$.[23] To establish the failure of maximal learning, I show that the latter probability remains bounded away from zero for $\underline{c} > 0$.

By way of contradiction, suppose that the probability of no agent in $\hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}$ sampling both actions converges to zero as $n \to \infty$ for any quality q, with $q < q(\underline{c})$, that the first action sampled by agent 1 can take. That is,

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} P_1(q)\left(\prod_{i=2}^{n} \left(1 - F_C(t_i(q)) \right) \right) = 0$$

(see the proof of Lemma 13 for how to derive this probability). Hence, the expected

---

[23]By assumption, $\omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$, and so $\min\{q_0, q_1\} < q(\underline{c})$. Therefore, the quality of the first action sampled by agent 1 is lower than $q(\underline{c})$ with positive probability.

additional gain from the second search for agent $n + 1$, given by

$$P_1(\hat{q}) \left(\prod_{i=2}^{n} \left(1 - F_C(t_i(\hat{q})) \right) \right) t^{\emptyset}(\hat{q})$$

(see (53) and the proof of Lemma 13), where $\hat{q}$ is the quality of the action taken by agent n, also converges to zero as $n \to \infty$ for all $\hat{q} < q(\underline{c})$. Then, there exists an agent $N_{\hat{q}} + 1$ for which the expected additional gain from the second search falls below $\underline{c}$.

By Assumption 2, there exists $\tilde{q}$ in the support of $\mathbb{P}_Q$ such that: (i) $\mathbb{P}_Q(\tilde{q} < q < q(\underline{c})) > 0$; (ii) with positive probability, the first agent does not sample another action if $q_{s_1^1} \geq \tilde{q}$, that is $1 - F_C(t^{\emptyset}(\tilde{q})) > 0$. Hence, with positive probability, agent 1 samples first a suboptimal action with quality, say, $\overline{q}$, and does not search further. Now suppose the first $N_{\overline{q}}$ agents all have costs larger than $t^{\emptyset}(\overline{q})$, which occurs with positive probability. By Lemma 13, each of these agents will sample the suboptimal action with quality $\overline{q}$ first, and none of these agents will search further. Therefore, all will take this suboptimal action. Agent $N_{\overline{q}} + 1$ also samples this action first, and does not search further either because his expected additional gain from the second search is smaller than $\underline{c}$. Since the expected additional gain from the second search in non-increasing in n, there will be no further search by agents $N_{\overline{q}} + 1$ onward, contradicting that the probability of no agent in $\hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}$ sampling both actions converges to zero. The desired result follows. ∎

Proof of part (b). Suppose $\omega \notin \overline{\Omega}(\underline{c})$ and $\underline{c} > 0$. Again, I establish that maximal learning fails by showing that the probability of no agent in $\hat{B}(n) \cup \{n\}$ sampling both actions remains bounded away from zero as $n \to \infty$.

Pick an infinite sequence of agents $(\pi_1, \pi_2, \ldots, \pi_k, \pi_{k+1}, \ldots)$ such that $B(\pi_1) = \emptyset$ and $\pi_k \in B(\pi_{k+1})$ for all agents $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Such a sequence must exist with probability one; otherwise, the network topology has non-expanding subnetworks and maximal learning fails. Moreover, by Lemma 4, each agent in this sequence samples first the action taken by his neighbor.

By way of contradiction, suppose that the probability of no agent in $\hat{B}(\pi_k) \cup \{\pi_k\}$ sampling both actions converges to zero as $k \to \infty$ for any quality q, with $q < q(\underline{c})$, that the first action sampled by agent π_1 can take. That is, $\lim_{k \to \infty} P_{\pi_{k+1}}(q) = 0$, where $P_{\pi_{k+1}}(\cdot)$ is the function defined by (8). It follows that the expected additional gain from the second search for agent π_{k+1}, given by $P_{\pi_{k+1}}(\hat{q}) t^{\emptyset}(\hat{q})$, where $\hat{q}$ is the quality of the action taken by π_k, also converges to zero as $k \to \infty$ for all $\hat{q} < q(\underline{c})$. Then, there exists an agent $\pi_{K_{\hat{q}}} + 1$ for which the expected additional gain from the second search falls below $\underline{c}$, and remains below this threshold for the agents in the sequence moving after $\pi_{K_{\hat{q}}} + 1$.

By Assumption 2, there exists $\tilde{q}$ in the support of $\mathbb{P}_Q$ such that: (i) $\mathbb{P}_Q(\tilde{q} < q < q(\underline{c})) > 0$; (ii) with positive probability, agent π_1 does not sample another action if $q_{s_{\pi_1}^1} \geq \tilde{q}$, that is $1 - F_C(t^{\emptyset}(\tilde{q})) > 0$. Therefore, with positive probability, agent π_1 samples first a suboptimal action with quality, say, $\overline{q}$, and does not search further. Now suppose that the first $\pi_{K_{\hat{q}}}$ agents in the sequence all have costs larger than $t^{\emptyset}(\overline{q})$, and again note that this occurs

with positive probability. By Lemma 4, each of these agents will sample the suboptimal action with quality $\bar{q}$ first, and none of these agents will search further. Therefore, all will take this suboptimal action. Agent $\pi_{K_{\hat{q}}} + 1$ also samples this action first, and does not search further either because his expected additional gain from the second search is smaller than $\underline{c}$. Since the expected additional gain from the second search remains smaller than $\underline{c}$ afterward, there will be no further search by agents in the sequence moving after agent $\pi_{K_{\hat{q}}} + 1$, contradicting that the probability of no agent in $\hat{B}(\pi_k) \cup \{\pi_k\}$ sampling both actions converges to zero. The desired result follows. ∎

B.5 Proofs for Section 6.2

Proof of Proposition 5

Proof of part (a). It is enough to construct a function $\tilde{\phi}: \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}$ such that, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \geq \tilde{\phi}(n) \qquad \text{and} \qquad 1 - \tilde{\phi}(n) = O\left(\frac{1}{n^{\frac{1}{K+1}}}\right).$$

Consider the sequence of neighbor choice function $(\gamma_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ where, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\gamma_n = n - 1$. Under the assumptions of the proposition, by Lemmas 7 and 13,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_{n+1}^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)$$
$$+ \left(1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)\right)^2 F_C\left(\left(1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)\right) t^\emptyset(q_{\max})\right). \tag{54}$$

If the search cost distribution has polynomial shape, from (54) we have

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_{n+1}^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)$$
$$+ L t^\emptyset(q_{\max})^K \left(1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)\right)^{K+2}. \tag{55}$$

Now we can build on Lobel et al. (2009) (see their proof of Proposition 2) to construct the function $\tilde{\phi}$. Adapting their procedure to my setup gives that the function $\tilde{\phi}$ we are looking for is

$$\tilde{\phi}(n) = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{(K+1) L t^\emptyset(q_{\max})^K \left(n + \overline{K}\right)}\right)^{\frac{1}{K+1}},$$

where $\overline{K}$ is some constant of integration (in the construction, $\tilde{\phi}$ is found as the solution to an ordinary differential equation).[24]

_____

[24]To apply a construction in the spirit of Lobel et al. (2009), the right-hand side of (55) must be

Proof of part (b). It is enough to construct a function $\tilde{\phi}\colon \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}$ such that, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \geq \tilde{\phi}(n) \qquad \text{and} \qquad 1 - \tilde{\phi}(n) = O\left(\frac{1}{(\log n)^{\frac{1}{K+1}}}\right).$$

Under the assumptions of the proposition,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_{n+1}^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{b=1}^n \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_{n+1}^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid B(n+1) = \{b\}\right)$$
$$= \frac{1}{n}\left[\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_{n+1}^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x \mid B(n+1) = \{n\}\right) + (n-1)\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)\right] \tag{56}$$

because conditional on observing the same $b < n$, agents n and $n+1$ have identical probabilities of making an optimal decision. By Lemmas 4 and 7, and since the search cost distribution has polynomial shape, we obtain that

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_{n+1}^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)$$
$$+ \frac{Lt^\emptyset(q_{\max})^K}{n}\left(1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x\right)\right)^{K+2}. \tag{57}$$

As for the proof of Proposition 5-part (b), we can now build on Lobel et al. (2009) (see their proof of Proposition 2) to construct the function $\tilde{\phi}$. Adapting their procedure to my setup gives that the function $\tilde{\phi}$ we are looking for is

$$\tilde{\phi}(n) = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{(K+1)Lt^\emptyset(q_{\max})^K\left(\log n + \overline{K}\right)}\right)^{\frac{1}{K+1}},$$

where $\overline{K}$ is some constant of integration (in the construction, $\tilde{\phi}$ is found as the solution to an ordinary differential equation). ∎

Proof of Proposition 6

In OIP networks, the result follows by combining Corollary 1 with Proposition 1 in MFP.

Next, suppose neighborhoods are independent with $\mathbb{Q}_n(B(n) = \{b\}) = 1/(n-1)$ for all $b \in \mathbb{N}_n$. By Lemma (4), in such network, each agent finds it optimal to sample first

---

increasing in $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_n^1 \in \arg\max_{x \in X} q_x)$. This is so under the assumption $0 < L < \frac{2^{K+1}}{(K+2)t^\emptyset\left(\underline{q}\right)^K}$ maintained in the proposition. The same remark applies to the right-hand side of (57) in the proof of part (b).

the action taken by his unique neighbor. Thus, the probability of a suboptimal herd is

$$
\begin{aligned}
\lim_{n\to\infty} &\left[\mathbb{P}_\Omega(q_0 < q_1) \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \mid q_0 < q_1 \right) \right. \\
&\left. + \mathbb{P}_\Omega(q_0 > q_1) \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 1, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \mid q_0 > q_1 \right) \right] \\
= \lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{1}{2} &\left[\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \mid q_0 < q_1 \right) \right. \\
&\left. + \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 1, c_k > t_k(q_1) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \mid q_0 > q_1 \right) \right],
\end{aligned}
\tag{58}
$$

where the equality holds because the qualities of the two actions are i.i.d. draws.

To begin, note that

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \mid q_0 < q_1 \right) \\
&\quad = \int_{q_0} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \right) \mathrm{d}\mathbb{P}_Q(q_0 \mid q_0 < q_1).
\end{aligned}
\tag{59}
$$

Next, note that

$$
\begin{aligned}
&t_{n+1}(q_0) \\
&= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{b=1}^{n} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n+1) \mid B(n+1) = \{b\}, a_b = 0, q_{s_{n+1}^1} = q_0 \right) t^\emptyset(q_0) \\
&= \frac{1}{n} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n+1) \mid B(n+1) = \{n\}, a_n = 0, q_{s_{n+1}^1} = q_0 \right) t^\emptyset(q_0) \\
&\quad + \frac{n-1}{n} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \right) t^\emptyset(q_0),
\end{aligned}
$$

from which we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n) \right) &= \frac{n}{n-1} \frac{t_{n+1}(q_0)}{t^\emptyset(q_0)} \\
&- \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n+1) \mid B(n+1) = \{n\}, a_n = 0, q_{s_{n+1}^1} = q_0 \right)}{n-1}.
\end{aligned}
\tag{60}
$$

For notational simplicity, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ define

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(\overline{E}_{n+1}^0 \right) := \mathbb{P}_\sigma\left(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall \, k \in \hat{B}(n+1) \mid B(n+1) = \{n\}, a_n = 0, q_{s_{n+1}^1} = q_0 \right).
$$

Together, (59) and (60) give

$$
\begin{aligned}
\lim_{n \to \infty} & \mathbb{P}_\sigma\Big(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \mid q_0 < q_1\Big) \\
&= \lim_{n \to \infty} \int_{q_0} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\Big(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n)\Big) \mathrm{d}\mathbb{P}_Q(q_0 \mid q_0 < q_1) \\
&= \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{n}{n-1} \int_{q_0} \frac{t_{n+1}(q_0)}{t^\emptyset(q_0)} \mathrm{d}\mathbb{P}_Q(q_0 \mid q_0 < q_1) \\
&\quad - \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n-1} \int_{q_0} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\Big(\overline{E}_{n+1}^0\Big) \mathrm{d}\mathbb{P}_Q(q_0 \mid q_0 < q_1).
\end{aligned}
\tag{61}
$$

As $0 \le \int_{q_0} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\overline{E}_{n+1}^0) \mathrm{d}\mathbb{P}_Q(q_0 \mid q_0 < q_1) \le 1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$
\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n-1} \int_{q_0} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\Big(\overline{E}_{n+1}^0\Big) \mathrm{d}\mathbb{P}_Q(q_0 \mid q_0 < q_1) = 0.
\tag{62}
$$

Next, note that: (i) $t_1(q_0) \ge t_n(q_0) \ge 0$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $q_0 \in Q$; (ii) $\{t_n(q_0)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a non-negative and decreasing sequence, and so must have a limit; (iii) by Theorems 1 and 2, $\lim_{n \to \infty} t_n(q_0) \le \underline{c}$ for all $q_0 \in Q$. Therefore, by the dominated convergence theorem,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{n}{n-1} \int_{q_0} \frac{t_{n+1}(q_0)}{t^\emptyset(q_0)} \mathrm{d}\mathbb{P}_Q(q_0 \mid q_0 < q_1) &= \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{n}{n-1} \int_{q_0} \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{t_{n+1}(q_0)}{t^\emptyset(q_0)} \mathrm{d}\mathbb{P}_Q(q_0 \mid q_0 < q_1) \\
&\le \underline{c} \int_{q_0} \frac{1}{t^\emptyset(q_0)} \mathrm{d}\mathbb{P}_Q(q_0 \mid q_0 < q_1) \\
&= \underline{c}\, \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\left[\frac{1}{t^\emptyset(q_0)} \,\middle|\, q_0 < q_1 \right].
\end{aligned}
\tag{63}
$$

By (61)–(63), we obtain

$$
\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\Big(s_1^1 = 0, c_k > t_k(q_0) \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \mid q_0 < q_1\Big) \le \underline{c}\, \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\left[\frac{1}{t^\emptyset(q_0)} \,\middle|\, q_0 < q_1 \right]
\tag{64}
$$

The exact same reasoning establishes that

$$
\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma\Big(s_1^1 = 1, c_k > t_k(q_1) \ \forall\, k \in \hat{B}(n) \mid q_0 > q_1\Big) \le \underline{c}\, \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\left[\frac{1}{t^\emptyset(q_1)} \,\middle|\, q_1 < q_0 \right].
\tag{65}
$$

Since the qualities of the two actions are i.i.d. draws,

$$
\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\left[\frac{1}{t^\emptyset(q_0)} \,\middle|\, q_0 < q_1 \right] = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\left[\frac{1}{t^\emptyset(q_1)} \,\middle|\, q_1 < q_0 \right].
\tag{66}
$$

The desired result follow by combining (58) and (64)–(66). ∎

B.6 Proofs for Section 6.3

Preliminaries

To begin, I set the notation that will be used in the proofs of Propositions 7 and 8.

▷ Let $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{S}'$ be two collective search environments with identical state process and search technology. Suppose that the network topology of $\mathcal{S}$ is the complete network and that in $\mathcal{S}'$ agents only observe their immediate predecessor. Let $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ and $\sigma' \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}'}$. Suppose agents break ties according to the same criterion in σ and σ'. In particular, assume that agent 1 selects uniformly at random which action to sample first, and that all agents sample the other action if indifferent at the second search stage.[25] Suppose also that the first action sampled by the first agent in σ and σ', say x, has the same quality q_x. Let $\delta \in (0, 1)$ be the discount factor, and let the function $t_1 : Q \to \mathbb{R}_+$ be defined pointwise by $t_1(q) := t^{\emptyset}(q)$.[26] Hereafter, $q_{\neg x}$ is a random variable with probability measure $\mathbb{P}_Q$.

▷ The expected discounted social utility normalized by $(1 - \delta)$ in equilibrium σ, denoted by $U_{\sigma}(q_x; \delta)$, is

$$
U_{\sigma}(q_x; \delta) = q_x + t_1(q_x) - (1 - \delta) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \left(\prod_{i=1}^{n} \left(1 - F_C\big(t_i\big(q_x\big)\big) \right) \right) t_1(q_x)
$$

$$
- (1 - \delta) \mathbb{P}_Q(q_{\neg x} > q_x) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\Big[c \mid c \le t_n(q_x)\Big] F_C(t_n(q_x)) \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} \left(1 - F_C(t_i(q_x)) \right)
$$

$$
- (1 - \delta) \mathbb{P}_Q(q_{\neg x} \le q_x) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\Big[c \mid c \le t_n(q_x)\Big] F_C(t_n(q_x)).
$$

To see this note that the first term is the quality of the first action sampled, and the second term is the additional gain from the second unsampled action. From this, we subtract the sum of the period n discounted gain from the unsampled action times the probability it was not sampled from period 1 to n. Further, we subtract the expected discounted cost of search, which consists of two parts. The first part,

$$
(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\Big[c \mid c \le t_n(q_x)\Big] F_C(t_n(q_x)) \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} \left(1 - F_C(t_i(q_x)) \right),
$$

is the expected discounted cost of search when $q_{\neg x} > q_x$. In this case, after agent n samples both actions, action x is revealed to be inferior in equilibrium to all agents moving after agent n. Therefore, no agent $m > n$ will sample action x again. The second part,

$$
(1 - \delta) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\Big[c \mid c \le t_n(q_x)\Big] F_C(t_n(q_x)),
$$

---

[25]This assumption simplifies the notation, but does not qualitatively affect the results.

[26]Redefining function $t^{\emptyset}$ with t_1 simplifies the notation in the following analysis.

is the expected discounted cost of search when $q_{\neg x} \leq q_x$. In this case, after agent n samples both actions, action $\neg x$ is inferior in equilibrium, but not revealed to be so to the agents moving after n. Therefore, all agents $m > n$ with $c_m \leq t_m(q_x)$ will sample action $\neg x$ again.

▷ The expected discounted social utility normalized by $(1-\delta)$ in equilibrium σ', denoted by $U_{\sigma'}(q_x; \delta)$, is

$$
U_{\sigma'}(q_x; \delta) = q_x + t_1(q_x) - (1-\delta) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \left(\prod_{i=1}^{n} \left(1 - F_C\big(t_i\big(q_x\big)\big) \right) \right) t_1(q_x)
$$

$$
- (1-\delta)\mathbb{P}_Q(q_{\neg x} > q_x) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\Big[c \mid c \leq t_n(q_x) \Big] F_C(t_n(q_x)) \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} \left(1 - F_C(t_i(q_x)) \right)
$$

$$
- (1-\delta)\mathbb{P}_Q(q_{\neg x} > q_x) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\Big[\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\Big[c \mid c \leq t_n(q_{\neg x}) \Big] F_C(t_n(q_{\neg x})) \mid q_{\neg x} > q_x \Big]
$$

$$
\cdot \left(1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} \left(1 - F_C(t_i(q_x)) \right) \right)
$$

$$
- (1-\delta)\mathbb{P}_Q(q_{\neg x} \leq q_x) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\Big[c \mid c \leq t_n(q_x) \Big] F_C(t_n(q_x)).
$$

$U_{\sigma'}(q_x; \delta)$ has the same interpretation as $U_\sigma(q_x; \delta)$, except for the expected discounted cost of search when $q_{\neg x} > q_x$, which is now

$$
(1-\delta) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\Big[c \mid c \leq t_n(q_x) \Big] F_C(t_n(q_x)) \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} \left(1 - F_C(t_i(q_x)) \right)
$$

$$
+ (1-\delta) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\Big[\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\Big[c \mid c \leq t_n(q_{\neg x}) \Big] F_C(t_n(q_{\neg x})) \mid q_{\neg x} > q_x \Big] \left(1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} \left(1 - F_C(t_i(q_x)) \right) \right).
$$

When agents only observe their immediate predecessor, they also fail to recognize actions that are revealed to be inferior in equilibrium by the time of their move. Therefore, differently than in the complete network, even if agent n samples both actions and $q_{\neg x} > q_x$, all agents $m > n$ with $c_m \leq t_m(q_{\neg x})$ will now sample action x again. Since the quality of action $\neg x$ is unknown (q_x is fixed, but $q_{\neg x}$ is a random variable), the expected cost of this additional search is

$$
\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\Big[\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\Big[c \mid c \leq t_n(q_{\neg x}) \Big] F_C(t_n(q_{\neg x})) \mid q_{\neg x} > q_x \Big].
$$

▷ Now consider a third collective search environment $\mathcal{S}''$ with the same state process and search technology as in $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{S}'$, but in which the network topology is any OIP network. Let $\sigma'' \in \Sigma_{\mathcal{S}''}$, and suppose indifferences are resolved in σ'' according to the same tie-breaking criterion as in σ and σ'. Assume also that the first action sampled by agent 1 in σ'', say x, has the same quality q_x as the action sampled at the first search by agent 1 in σ, σ'. Let $U_{\sigma''}(q_x; \delta)$ denote the expected discounted social utility normalized by $(1-\delta)$ in equilibrium σ''. Assume the single decision maker selects the first action to

sample uniformly at random, and that he samples the second action in case of indifference. The next lemma is immediate from the discussion in Section 6.3.

Lemma 14. *For all $q_x \in Q$ and $\delta \in (0,1)$, we have*

$$U_\sigma(q_x; \delta) \geq U_{\sigma''}(q_x; \delta) \geq U_{\sigma'}(q_x; \delta).$$

▷ Finally, denote with $U_{DM}(q_x; \delta)$ the expected discounted social utility normalized by $(1-\delta)$ that is implemented by the single decision maker in any OIP network after sampling an action, say x, of quality q_x at the first search at time period 1. Again, assume that the single decision maker selects the action to sample first uniformly at random at time period 1, and that he samples the second action whenever indifferent. I refer to Section III.A. in MFP for the derivation of $U_{DM}(q_x; \delta)$. Since the single decision maker's problem is the same in all OIP networks, of which the complete network is an example, the same analysis applies unchanged in my setting.

Proof of Proposition 7

The difference in average social utilities, $U_\sigma(q_x; \delta) - U_{\sigma'}(q_x; \delta)$, is

$$(1-\delta)\mathbb{P}_Q(q_{\neg x} > q_x) \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\left[\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\left[c \mid c \leq t_n(q_{\neg x})\right] F_C(t_n(q_{\neg x})) \mid q_{\neg x} > q_x\right]$$
$$\cdot \left(1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} \left(1 - F_C(t_i(q_x))\right)\right). \tag{67}$$

As (67) is positive for all $\delta \in (0,1)$, that $U_\sigma(q_x; \delta) > U_{\sigma'}(q_x; \delta)$ for all $\delta \in (0,1)$ follows.

To show that $\lim_{\delta \to 1} [U_\sigma(q_x; \delta) - U_{\sigma'}(q_x; \delta)] = 0$, we need to show that (67) converges to zero as $\delta \to 1$. To do so, it is enough to argue that

$$\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\left[\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\left[c \mid c \leq t_n(q_{\neg x})\right] F_C(t_n(q_{\neg x})) \mid q_{\neg x} > q_x\right]$$

is finite. Notice that

$$0 \leq \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\left[\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_C}\left[c \mid c \leq t_n(q_{\neg x})\right] F_C(t_n(q_{\neg x})) \mid q_{\neg x} > q_x\right]$$

$$\leq \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_Q}\left[t_n(q_{\neg x}) F_C(t_n(q_{\neg x})) \mid q_{\neg x} > q_x\right]$$

$$\leq \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \delta^n \sup_{q > q_x} t_n(q) F_C(t_n(q))$$

$$\leq \sum_{n=\bar{n}+1}^{\infty} \delta^n \sup_{q > q_x} t_n(q) F_C(t_n(q)) + \bar{n} \sup_{q > q_x} t^\emptyset(q)$$

$$\approx \sum_{n=\bar{n}+1}^{\infty} \delta^n \sup_{q > q_x} \left(t_n(q)\right)^2 f_C(0) + \bar{n} \sup_{q > q_x} t^\emptyset(q)$$

66

$$\approx \sum_{n=\bar{n}+1}^{\infty} \delta^n \sup_{q>q_x} \left(t^{\emptyset}(q)\right)^2 \frac{1}{f_C(0)n^2} + \bar{n} \sup_{q>q_x} t^{\emptyset}(q),$$

where $\bar{n}$ is large enough for $t_n(q)$ to be close to 0. Since $\sum_{n=\bar{n}+1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^2}$ and $\bar{n} \sup_{q>q_x} t^{\emptyset}(q)$ are finite, the desired result follows. ∎

Proof of Proposition 8

First, suppose $\underline{c} = 0$. Wee need to show that $\lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{\sigma''}(q_x; \delta) = \lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{DM}(q_x; \delta)$. By Proposition 7, $\lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{\sigma}(q_x; \delta) = \lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{\sigma'}(q_x; \delta)$. Moreover, by Lemma 14, $U_{\sigma}(q_x; \delta) \geq U_{\sigma''}(q_x; \delta) \geq U_{\sigma'}(q_x; \delta)$ Therefore, by the sandwich theorem for limits of functions,

$$\lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{\sigma''}(q_x; \delta) = \lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{\sigma}(q_x; \delta). \tag{68}$$

By Proposition 3 in MFP,

$$\lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{\sigma}(q_x; \delta) = \lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{DM}(q_x; \delta). \tag{69}$$

Then, by (68) and (69), and the uniqueness of the limit of a function, we have

$$\lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{\sigma''}(q_x; \delta) = \lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{DM}(q_x; \delta),$$

which gives the desired result.

Now suppose that $\lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{\sigma''}(q_x; \delta) = \lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{DM}(q_x; \delta)$. We need to show that $\underline{c} = 0$. Since the complete network is an OIP network, it follows that $\lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{\sigma}(q_x; \delta) = \lim_{\delta \to 1} U_{DM}(q_x; \delta)$. That $\underline{c} = 0$ immediately follows by Proposition 3 in MFP. ∎

B.7   Proofs for Section 6.4

Proof of Proposition 9

By an inductive argument as the one proving Lemma 13-part(i), each agent samples first the action taken by his immediate predecessor. The result follows from the discussion in Section 6.4. ∎

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